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Abstract
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) is a regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) comprised of over
fifty cooperating states and fishing entities. It manages Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna
(Thunnus thynnus) in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Due to overfishing
and ineffective management, the stock abundance of this species has declined to about
thirty percent of its unfished biomass in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.
Publications point to this poor stock status as evidence of a fisheries management
failure; it is commonly repeated that ICCAT’s mismanagement of the resource
amounts to an international disgrace. To maintain bluefin tuna stocks at a level that
can support maximum sustainable yield (MSY), ICCAT has implemented unique tools
to manage this important fishery, which include Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits,
tuna ranching control measures, catch documentation, and others that are not
employed in other ICCAT fisheries.
In this thesis research, I examine the factors that contribute to the tools utilized
to manage the fishery in the ICCAT Convention Area to shed light on why they are
managed differently than other ICCAT stocks. To do this, I conducted a literature
review on publicly available ICCAT reports, governmental and non-governmental
documents, peer reviewed scientific literature, and other sources to understand and
explain the relevant importance of each contributing factor to the management of the
species. I utilized key informant interview methodology to obtain insights from
twelve bluefin tuna experts representing a variety of interests that attend ICCAT

	
  

	
  
official meetings. I transcribed and collected insights from semi-structured interviews,
which I used to ground-truth the findings of the literature review.
No single factor is responsible for the unique management in place to govern
ICCAT’s bluefin tuna fishery. Rather, a nuanced interaction of many important
factors contributes to the species’ poor stock status and unique management. The
history and complex nature of the fishery, unique biology of the species, strong
demand in the world sushi market, impact of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing, and political will of ICCAT member countries to enforce
Recommendations and Resolutions influence which measures are adopted and
implemented. This finding contrasts peer reviewed literature and other information to
the contrary that attribute the unique management and poor stock status of bluefin tuna
to such factors as high market value of the species’ meat, ineffective ICCAT
management, Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons,” or the “free riding” of noncooperating fishing entities fully.
Based on key informant interviews, expert respondents share a high level of
agreement that the special, “iconic” status that bluefin tuna have attained in popular
media, scientific publications, and in general public opinion is an important factor that
contributes to their management. I argue that the powerful symbol that bluefin tuna
has become in the policy realm affects its management in direct and indirect ways.
This thesis research provides analyses of these various forces and the management
context of the species, and shares recommendations for improving management of
bluefin tuna and other ICCAT stocks.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
A. Research Topic
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) is the regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) tasked with the
conservation and management of fisheries for highly migratory tuna and tuna-like
species in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, including the Northern Atlantic
bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus). For the remainder of this thesis, I will use the term
“bluefin tuna” to refer to Thunnus thynnus unless otherwise noted. Through an
international agreement with nearly fifty member parties, ICCAT sets harvest policies
to ensure the long-term sustainable yield, called Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
in fisheries literature, from stocks of the species under their management (ICCAT
2011c). For several decades, the stocks of this species have not been managed at
MSY (ICCAT 2008). In the following chapters, I provide evidence that bluefin tuna
attract a majority of the management capacity and effort of ICCAT, and that this
species is managed differently than other ICCAT stocks due to a variety of factors.
The main focus of this thesis is finding out why this is the case.

B. Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this thesis, I explore ICCAT’s different management of bluefin tuna
compared to other stocks through a two-part research question:
Why are bluefin tuna managed differently than other species under ICCAT’s
purview?
What factors (such as stock status, market value, complex biology of the
species, nature of the fishery, and intense media attention, etc.) contribute to
this unique management?
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I rely on a literature review of publicly available information and key
informant experiences to explore this question and to test six hypotheses that are
grounded in conventional wisdom on bluefin tuna management:
1. High market value of bluefin tuna meat does not fully account for the
unique management of this species.
2. Individual market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishing
industry are not greater in proportion to the management tools employed in this
fishery to other ICCAT-managed fisheries.
3. Bluefin tuna have achieved an “iconic” or “charismatic” status in popular
media, peer-reviewed literature, and in non-governmental group
publications that other ICCAT-managed stocks have not.
4. This “iconic” status contributes to the management approaches adopted by
ICCAT to manage this species differently than others, and has important
implications for both the resource and the fishing industry.
5. Non-scientific information and political pressure play a major role in
influencing which management tools are adopted at ICCAT meetings, and a
disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is afforded to
bluefin tuna.
6. Media scrutiny and heightened status of bluefin tuna affects ICCAT’s
ability to effectively manage the species.
For this research, I define market value as the sum of the average market price
paid per unit of weight over the MSY estimate provided by ICCAT’s scientific body,
the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics. An “iconic” species is one that
embodies cultural or societal values, and often has for extended periods of time. A
“charismatic” species is similar to an “iconic” one but has physical attributes such as
large size, great speed, perceived intelligence, or exceeding rarity that help humans
identify with them moreso than with other organisms that do not share these traits.

2	
  	
  

	
  
I test these hypotheses through a comparison of the findings of a literature
review with responses of one dozen key informants that have an in-depth knowledge
of ICCAT management. I provide evidence to support the idea that the current
paradigms used to frame and understand the bluefin tuna management regime in the
Atlantic Ocean, namely the “Tragedy of the Commons,” the high market value of the
fish, and the failure of the weak international governance regime of ICCAT masks the
complexity and true nature of the structure in place to manage bluefin tuna.

C. Common Explanations for Poor Stock Status of the Species
In published fisheries, economics, conservation biology, and political science
literature, ICCAT’s management of bluefin tuna is pointed to as a failure, but authors
cite a variety of causes (Fromentin and Fonteneau 2001, Magnuson et al. 2001,
ICCAT 2008, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Aranda et al. 2010, Longo and Clausen 2011,
Conathan 2012). I developed my hypotheses to test these ideas. Public media often
cite Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” as the cause of the decline of the
species, wherein Hardin argues that individuals acting in their own self-interest
eventually cause the degradation of open-access resources (Hardin 1968, Nickler
1999, McWhinnie 2006, The Economist 2008, Revkin 2008, Sumaila and Huang
2012). Internet searches reveal articles with a similar thrust:
If EVER there were a graphic illustration of the tragedy of the commons, it
is the plummeting of the world's stocks of bluefin tuna (The Economist 2008).
I used this line of thinking to develop Hypotheses 1 and 2. I link Hypotheses 1
and 2 with the “Tragedy of the Commons” common explanation found in the literature
based on the fact that bluefin tuna is the most valuable individual fish in the world
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(Porch 2005). Due to the very high value of the fish, it is commonly perceived that
catching a single fish is like “winning the lottery.” This seems to fuel the
misperception that bluefin tuna fishers race to catch every last fish and that this drives
the overexploitation of the resource (Ruais 2012). This is simply untrue; the average
bluefin tuna fisher never obtains the very high exvessel prices that are paid for
outstanding specimens on Tsukiji Fish Market’s auction floors (Ruais 2012).
Others argue that the degraded bluefin fishery results from the sum of
individual greed of fishers from each ICCAT nation, which drives the over
exploitation of this valuable ICCAT fishery (Nickler 1999, Fromentin and Fonteneau
2001, Fromentin and Powers 2005, Revkin 2008, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Greenberg
2010). Conventional wisdom in literature confounds the high individual value of a
bluefin tuna with high market value of the fishery as a whole (Magnuson et al. 2001,
McWhinnie 2006, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Conathan 2012). It is a commonly-held
belief that the high market value of the species drives its degradation by encouraging
overfishing for individual gain and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing
that drive a “Tragedy of the Commons” scenario (Magnuson et al. 2001, Fromentin
and Powers 2005, MacKenzie et al. 2008). This led me to develop Hypothesis 2.
Next, some authors point to weaknesses in the regimes of RFMOs in general
and lack of collective political will to effectively regulate resources as major drivers of
the degradation of the world’s tuna fisheries (Aranda et al. 2010, Collette et al. 2011).
Several sources attribute this lack of political will to effectively manage bluefin tuna
to the prevalence of non-scientific information and elevated, “iconic” or “charismatic”
status of the species, which led me to develop Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 6 to shed light
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on the management of the species (Whynott 1995, Weber 2002, Fromentin and Ravier
2005, Porch 2005, ICCAT 2008, Safina and Klinger 2008, ICIJ 2010, Ruais 2011).

D. Research Context
Bluefin tuna are the largest, widest ranging, and most valuable of all bony
fishes, and have been actively pursued by humans for millennia (Mather et al. 1995,
See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) image.

Photo from NMFS Photo Library: Web: <http://www.photolib.noaa.gov/bluefin>.
Accessed 28 September 2012.
These facts are important to keep in mind when considering that ICCAT has
consistently set harvest recommendations that are far above the best scientific
evidence and the recommendations of their scientific experts, and that they have used
different tools to manage this fishery (ICCAT 2008, Pew 2010, ICIJ 2010, NMFS
2012a). As a result of overfishing, stocks of this species, or fish populations that have
been divided up for management purposes, have steadily declined in the western and
eastern Atlantic Ocean/Mediterranean Sea for decades (ICIJ 2010, Pew 2010,
Boustany 2011, Collette et al. 2011, Sumaila and Huang 2012). ICCAT manages
bluefin tuna more intensely and differently than any other species. The number,
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variety, and attributes of management tools ICCAT employs to regulate bluefin tuna
make their governance unique among ICCAT stocks (See Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4).

Table 1. ICCAT fishery management tools in the form of legally binding
Recommendations and voluntary Resolutions, used for bluefin tuna since 1972. Note:
Bolded tools are unique to the bluefin fishery.
BLUEFIN TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW
Fishery Management Tool

Type of
Tool

Minimum Size Limit

Year and
Recommendation
/ Resolution
Identification #
1974-01

Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Percentage Shares

1981-01

Output

Research Quota Set-Aside

1991-01

Input

Bluefin Certification/Documentation
Closed Season/Area for Longlining

1993-05
1993-07

Output
Input

Spotter Plane Ban
Management Boundary Line

1995-07
1996-05

Input
Input

Mandatory Observer Coverage

1997-03

Output

Recovery Plan Implementation for Western
Stock, Effort Reduction

1998-07

Input

Vessel Registration
Regulations Governing At-Sea Transfers to
Farming Operations
IUU Vessel Blacklist
Recovery Plan Implementation for
Eastern/Mediterranean Stock, Effort Reduction
Capacity Reduction Program
Catch Documentation Scheme
Multilateral Trade Sanctions against CPCs

2000-08
2000-10

Input
Input

2003-08
2006-05

Input
Input

2006-08
2007-04
2008-06

Input
Output
Input

Atlantic-Wide Research Programme for
Bluefin Tuna (GBYP)

2011-06

Input

TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES:
Data from ICCAT 2012b.

14
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For comparison, Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the ICCAT Recommendations
and Resolutions taken to date in the bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna
fisheries in that order. Note that there were 21, 38, and 4 ICCAT management
measures implemented, in that order, for these fisheries since 1979 (ICCAT 2012b).

Table 2. Summary of management tools used by ICCAT to manage bigeye tuna.
BIGEYE TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW
Fishery Management Tool

Type of
Tool

Minimum Size Limit

ICCAT Recommendation/
Resolution Identification #
and Year
1997-01

Capacity Reduction

1997-13

Input

Monitoring/ Enforcement Sanctions
Vessel Registration

1997-15
1998-02

Output
Input

TAC Percentage Shares

2000-01

Output

Implementation of a Multi-Year
Conservation Plan
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES:
Data from ICCAT 2012b.

2004-01

Input

Output

2

Table 3. Summary of fishery management tools used by ICCAT to manage swordfish.
SWORDFISH MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW
ICCAT Recommendation/
Fishery Management Tool
Resolution Identification # Type of
and Year
Tool
Minimum Size Limit
1990-02
Output
TAC Percentage Shares

1995-11

Output

Management Boundary Split

1996-07

Input

Rebuilding Plan Implementation for
Swordfish
Time/Area Closures and Gear Restrictions

1999-02

Input

1999-04

Input

Gear Restrictions for Bycatch Reduction
Gear Restrictions for Fishing Mortality
Reduction on Juvenile Swordfish
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES:
Data from ICCAT 2012b.

2000-03
2009-04

Input
Input

13
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Table 4. Summary of management tools used by ICCAT to manage yellowfin tuna.
YELLOWFIN TUNA MANAGEMENT TOOL OVERVIEW
ICCAT Recommendation/
Fishery Management Tool
Resolution Identification #
Type of
and Year
Tool
Minimum Size Limit
1972-01
Output
Effort Reduction Program
1993-04
Input
Request for CPC Implementation
1995-06
Input
and Compliance with Rules
Repealing Minimum Size Limit
2005-01
Output
TOTAL ACTIVE MEASURES:
Data from ICCAT 2012b.

0

ICCAT employs a variety of input and output fishery controls in the bigeye,
bluefin, yellowfin tuna and swordfish fisheries. While no discernable trend emerges
in preference for specific usage of tools over time in each fishery, bluefin tuna have
had significantly more and varied management measures implemented for them. The
total number of active management measures in place for bluefin tuna (14) is similar
to the total of the other three fisheries (15). However, there were more management
measures implemented by ICCAT for bluefin tuna (64) than for these three other
species combined (63) since its inception in 1969 (ICCAT 2012b). Only the bluefin
tuna fishery has a catch documentation/certification scheme, IUU vessel blacklist,
multilateral trade sanctions against countries, TAC set-asides for research, mandatory
observer coverage for the purse seine fleet and at-sea transferring of fish, or an
Atlantic-wide research program in place (ICCAT 2012b). Also, ICCAT seems as
though it has been willing to implement more intensive management measures for its
bluefin tuna fishery that require significant cooperation for monitoring and
enforcement by CPCs than those used in other fisheries.
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ICCAT uses input measures such as time/area closures in the Gulf of Mexico
and the banning of longlining in the Mediterranean Sea to protect spawning
aggregations of bluefin tuna and to reduce bycatch of juvenile ICCAT-managed
stocks, respectively (ICCAT 2010b). Gear restrictions that ban the use of driftnets and
spotter planes also ensure that planes do not guide purse seiners to find and capture
entire schools of bluefin tuna, which is how that fishery rapidly developed in the past
(ICCAT 2010b). ICCAT also uses output controls that focus on helping to accurately
constrain total catch in the fishery (Pope 2012). The percentage share TACs for CPCs
under ICCAT’s management, certification schemes such as the bluefin catch
documentation scheme, and mandatory observer coverage are examples of output
controls. These tools contrast with typical input fisheries management tools used to
reduce fishing effort and intensity (Pope 2012).
A second group of management measures unique to the bluefin tuna fishery
relate to research and statistics. Research set-asides of the overall TAC for each stock
of bluefin tuna allow scientists to implement the Atlantic-Wide Research Program for
Bluefin Tuna, or “Grande”. Grande is funded by CPCs and implemented in various
CPC countries through tagging programs and aerial surveys to estimate relative
abundance of bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2012a).
Third, multilateral trade sanctions have been used against countries that flag
vessels that have been found out of compliance with ICCAT requirements for
participating in fisheries under their jurisdiction (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012a). This
mechanism effectively removes the major buyers in the world bluefin tuna market
from trade such as Japan, USA, and EU (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012a). Finally, measures
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regarding the at-sea-transfer of live bluefin tuna to tow cages and net-pens for
fattening only apply in the Mediterranean Sea. The mandatory observer coverage of
such transfers seeks to reduce uncertainties over total catch of the
Eastern/Mediterranean stock of bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2010b).

E. Status of the Species
Current estimates suggest that Northern bluefin tuna stocks in the Atlantic
Ocean and Mediterranean Sea represent about 30% of the 1970s population, which is
when large-scale industrial fishing for the species began in earnest (Boustany 2011,
Fromentin and Powers 2005, Safina and Klinger 2008, Aranda et al. 2010, ICCAT
2010b). This depleted status of the species in the Convention Area represents a
failure, in biological terms, of ICCAT as a whole. These stock levels are not sufficient
to support MSY, which is ICCAT’s stated management goal for every stock under its
jurisdiction. The governments of Sweden, Kenya, and Monaco each sponsored
motions to list the Atlantic bluefin tuna as “endangered” under Appendix I of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) in order to halt their sale worldwide (ICCAT 2010b, IUCN Redlist 2011,
CITES 2012). Such protection would liken sale of bluefin tuna meat to trade in
elephant ivory: an illegal act internationally. The poor spawning stock biomass of both
bluefin tuna stocks in the Convention Area, coupled with various attempts to secure
legal protection for the species in international fora strongly suggest that ICCAT is
failing its management mandate to sustain stocks at MSY levels (Aranda et al. 2010).
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In light of this failure, I assessed the difference in management of the bluefin
tuna fishery versus other ICCAT fisheries and their relative effectiveness according to
whether or not they have helped ICCAT to reach its management goal of sustaining
stocks at levels that sustain MSY according to ICCAT reports and other publications.
As both bluefin tuna stocks are currently overfished, it seems as though every
management tool has failed, but this is not necessarily the case. Some tools, such as
those that address the ranching of bluefin tuna that is unique to that fishery, have had a
positive impact on the illegal transfer or live bluefin from catching vessels to net pens
(ICIJ 2010, Pew 2010). However, other tools that are not unique to the bluefin fishery
have largely failed to curtail fishing effort or total mortality in the fishery (Sumaila
and Huang 2012). I provide a master list of management tools evaluated in this thesis
research with some indication of the success or failure of each and some context to lay
the groundwork for the unique management in place in the bluefin tuna fishery (See
Table 5).

11	
  
	
  

	
  
Table 5. Master list of bluefin tuna management tools examined, effectiveness, and
pecularities of bluefin tuna fishery that affect their success or failure.
ICCAT
Success/
Management
Failure
Bluefin Fishery Context
Tool
Immature bluefin tuna are still captured by purse
Minimum size
Failure
seines for tuna ranching operations in the
limits
Mediterranean Sea, which undermines rebuilding
spawning stock
Time/area
closures
Effort
reduction
Total
Allowable
Catches
(TACs)
Gear
restrictions
Mandatory
observer
coverage

Failure
Uncertain
Success

Countries share TAC allocations that have been set
within scientific recommendations; 2012 estimates
show both stocks are increasing in abundance

Failure

Have not reduced total catch or mortality

Failure

Have not reduced IUU fishing overall

Catch
documentation
Vessel
blacklist

Failure

Research setasides
Management
units for stocks

Uncertain

Recovery plans

Success

Capacity
reduction
Vessel
registration

Closures in the Gulf of Mexico and Tyrrhenian Sea
have not measurably affected stock status
Effort reduced across Convention Area in aggregate,
but bluefin tuna stocks remain overfished

Failure

Failure

Uncertain
Failure

Have not significantly reduced IUU fishing,
currently being replaced by ICCAT for 2013 fishing
year with electronic program
Have not succeeded in permanently removing
offending vessels from fishery
Led to increased scientific understanding of bluefin
tuna life history, but not have not informed
management changes as hoped
Splitting bluefin tuna into two stocks has not
reduced fishing effort or mortality on the whole
Agreed-upon management frameworks with
scientifically based reference points and timelines
for rebuilding have helped stocks
Capacity reduced in some of the Convention Area,
but in aggregate have not reduced fishing effort
Unregistered vessels continue to pursue bluefin tuna
every fishing year

Data from ICCAT 2012b, ICCAT 2008.
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Based on my assessment of these tools, only two of thirteen major
management tool categories employed in the bluefin tuna fishery have been successful
to date in measurably reducing total fishing mortality (total catch) and fishing effort
(amount of time spent fishing) for bluefin tuna in the ICCAT Convention Area. Effort
reduction, capacity reduction, and research set-asides have all had uncertain outcomes
in terms of buoying stock status to MSY-sustaining levels because their impacts are
difficult to measure without reliable numbers. Two out of thirteen successful tools is a
fairly bad measure by any count, but ICCAT itself may not be to blame for the failure
of most of the tools it employs in the bluefin tuna fishery.
There should be some consideration of the nature and peculiarities of the
bluefin tuna fishery that affect the relative effectiveness of each tool. The majority of
the fishing pressure on bluefin tuna is exerted in the Mediterranean Sea by about a
dozen countries from many different ports with different abilities to effectively police
their waters and enforce ICCAT binding Recommendations and voluntary
Resolutions. There is no ICCAT inspection team that scans the Mediterranean to
enforce their rules. Rather, monitoring and enforcement of minimum size limits, gear
restrictions, time/area closures, vessel blacklists, accurate registration, and catch
documentation are up to each individual Contracting Party Country. Therefore, it is
perhaps not surprising that many of these tools have failed in the ICCAT Convention
Area, but not for lack of trying. ICCAT is only as strong as its CPCs, and political
will, funding, and resources must be allocated by each respective country to ensure
that tools are effective in sustaining stocks at MSY-sustaining levels. It is through this
lens of the failure of various management tools that we must consider the factors that
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contribute to their adoption and success or failure over time for the remainder of this
thesis research. Failure of specific management tools and in an aggregate failure of
ICCAT to sustain healthy bluefin tuna stocks under its management are strong drivers
for the specific management framework in place currently (Aranda et al. 2010).

F. ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Fishery Compared to Global Tuna Fisheries
While a large amount of information has been published on the management of
Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna in the past several decades, harvest of this species
accounted for less than 10% of tuna catch in the world’s oceans by weight in 2010
(FAO 2011, See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Contributions of commercial tuna species to world tuna catch in 2010.

Image from FAO 2011, pg.3
I want to explore why this is the case. I am interested in the poor stock status
of the species, the popularity of ICCAT management of the stock in fisheries
management literature, and the general causal statements regarding the collapse of this
species in published documents. To investigate these areas of interest, I examine the

14	
  
	
  

	
  
characteristics of the fishery to clarify and understand the factors that contribute to
bluefin tuna management. In this thesis, I provide background information on bluefin
tuna and the fisheries that developed to catch it. I explore the factors that contribute to
its management in Chapters II and III. Some of the most common explanations for the
specific management tools ICCAT employs in the bluefin tuna fishery are discussed in
Chapter III. In Chapter IV, I discuss a literature review and key informant interview
methodology used to test my six hypotheses. Chapters V and VI describe my findings
and results, and provide a discussion and policy recommendations for ICCAT based
on this thesis research.
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND OF THE SPECIES AND THE FISHERY
1. The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna
A. Biology
Northern Atlantic bluefin are the largest of the three bluefin tuna species and
are capable of growing to over ten feet in length and weighing nearly 1,500 pounds
(Mather et al. 1995, See Figure 3).

Figure 3. Typical horizontal and vertical distribution of tunas in the water column.

FAO 2012b, pg. 4.
Bluefin tuna must swim continuously to push oxygenated water over their gills
to breathe, which forces them to adopt a highly migratory lifestyle (Mather et al. 1995,
Maggio 2000, Ehrenberg 2008).

B. Life History
As a result of their physiology and highly migratory lifestyle, bluefin tuna
expend energy keeping themselves warm while they hunt in cold waters, and thus
spend relatively less time growing large or producing eggs or milt for spawning (Porch
2005, Teo et al. 2006). Bluefin tuna stocks often fluctuation in abundance
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considerably over time, which makes it difficult to reliably estimate their abundance
and biomass and to manage fisheries for them (Mather et al. 1995, Porch 2005).
Without accurate estimates of biomass, it is difficult to set harvest guidelines for stock
(Porch 2005). Thus, bluefin tuna have a high susceptibility to overexploitation and low
resiliency of its stocks to overfishing (Porch 2005).
Bluefin tuna typically spawn in large aggregations in warm waters in the Gulf
of Mexico and in the Mediterranean Sea (Porch 2005). Data from multiple tagging
studies suggest that western Atlantic-origin bluefin that spawn in the Gulf of Mexico
have a median spawning age, or age of maturity, of nearly eleven to twelve years
(Block et al. 2001). This contrasts the estimate four- to five-year median age of
maturity of bluefin that spawn in the Mediterranean Sea (NMFS 2011). Reliable
patterns of spawning migrations make the species susceptible to overfishing because
large schools of spawning fish are easily targeted by fishers (NMFS 2011).
	
  
C. Complex Migrations
Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna were split into two stocks for management
considerations based on total Atlantic Ocean catch in 1980 according to their
migratory patterns across the Atlantic basin, called mixing (Powers and Porch 2004).
Bluefin abundance varies in these areas based on a number of factors such as
recruitment, food availability, oceanic currents, and other environmental factors
(Galuardi et al. 2010, See Figure 4). The current state of the debate over the two stocks
is that it is not reflective of the biology of the fish and should be replaced by another
management framework in the future.
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Figure 4. Estimated tracks of adult bluefin tuna tagged in the western Atlantic Ocean
based on satellite data from 2005 and 2006.

Image from Galuardi et al. 2010. Figure 3, pg. 971. Note: Individual bluefin swim
from one side of the Atlantic to the other in a given year.
The extent to which mixing occurs in spawning areas and feeding grounds
remains hotly-contested in the scientific literature and fishing industry publications
because it affects how shares of total catch of bluefin are divided among countries by
ICCAT (Lutcavage 2001, Powers and Porch 2004, Secor et al. 2011).

2. Description of the Fisheries for Bluefin Tuna
A. Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea Fishery History
The fishery for bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea is one of the oldest
documented fisheries in the world, as evidenced by cave paintings on the islands of
Sicily that date back to circa 4000 BC (Desse and Desse-Berset 1994, Mather et al.
1995, Whynott 1995, Maggio 2000, FAO 2012). Fishers operated elaborate walled-net
pen traps, called tonnaras, to catch out-migrating tuna that had spawned in the
Mediterranean Sea as early as 2000 BC (Maggio 2000, FAO 2012, See Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Diagram of a traditional tonnara, or fish trap made of net pens anchored to
shore and the seafloor, from Sicily (Maggio 2000).

Figure from: Un Mare D’Mare. 2012.
In Maggio’s ethnographic work La Mattanza, she highlights the symbolic and cultural
importance of the annual bluefin migration:
The bluefin were to ancient Mediterranean peoples what the buffalo was
to the American Plains Indian: a yearly miracle, a reliable source of protein
from a giant animal they revered, one that passed in such numbers that the
cooperation of an entire tribe was needed to kill them and preserve their meat.
Around the Mediterranean the migrating bluefin was a staple food for entire
civilizations (Maggio 2000, pg. 10).
Various Mediterranean islands had thriving tuna fishing and salting industries
since the thirteenth century, and harpooning, seining, and drift netting have been
commonly employed since (Mather et al. 1995, Maggio 2000). There is evidence of
tuna spotting towers excavated at Cosa in modern day Italy from 100 BC (McCann et
al. 1987). Despite changes in the fisheries for bluefin tuna, the species remains very
important across the Mediterranean region and beyond (ICCAT 2012a).

B. Common Methods of Capture
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The majority of bluefin tuna caught in the Convention Area are captured by
purse seines, longlines, baitboats, and rod and reel fishers (ICCAT 2012a). These
methods were developed based on the attributes of bluefin, such as their migratory
patterns and aggregating habits when spawning (FAO 2012c, See Figure 6).

Figure 6. Common fishing methods around Atlantic Ocean. Clockwise from top right:
1. purse seining; 2. bottom trawling; 3. mid-water trawling; 4. drift netting; 5.
longlining; 6. hook and line or trolling; 7. harpooning.

Image from: Joseph Shoulak Illustrations, WSJ Graphics, in: The Wall Street Journal
“The Slippery Business of Picking Fish”. 2 March 2011.
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Purse seining is a common bluefin tuna fishing method and works by
encircling a school of bluefin with a large net and then pulling the bottom of the net
closed with a running line, like closing a purse. This method is used almost
exclusively in the Mediterranean to supply tuna fattening operations (Pew 2010,
ICCAT 2010a). Bottom trawling and mid-water trawling and drift netting are
unselective methods of capture and have been banned in the ICCAT Convention Area
due to high incidence of killing non-target species, called bycatch (ICCAT 2010a, Pew
2010). Longlines are fishing lines with many baited hooks that capture fish by hooking
and holding them until they are pulled in, and are used extensively throughout the
Atlantic Ocean (Mather et al. 1995, Tudela 2004).
Hook and line fishers and trollers pull lines with baited hooks through the
water column on small boats with machinery or rods and reels (Mather et al. 1995).
Bluefin fishers off the coast of North America typically “chunk” or “chum” dead, cut
up baitfish to create “slicks” of blood that attract them to baited hooks (Whynott
1995). This method is very selective, as species captured are precisely targeted and
undersized or undesirable fish can be released alive, unlike many of the other methods
described here (Ravier and Fromentin 2001, Tudela 2004). Harpoon fishing is
employed in select regions of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea, especially in the
Gulf of Maine off the coast of North America. This method specifically targets
“giant” –bluefin tuna larger than 73 inches near the surface of the water. This method
is highly selective because the harpooner must physically see and judge the size of the
fish before the throw is made to secure the tuna to a line and pull it aboard the vessel
(Whynott 1995, ABTA 2012).
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C. History of the Western Atlantic Fishery
The western Atlantic fishery for bluefin tuna is significantly younger and
decidedly different than the Mediterranean fishery. Trophy sportfishing for giant (>
1,000 pounds) bluefin tuna along “Tuna Alley” near Nova Scotia started in earnest in
the 1930s, and by the 1940s a small market emerged for their meat (Mather et al.
1995). In the 1950s, trolling and trapping methods for smaller fish developed using
more efficient methods such as live bait, pelagic longline, and purse seining. They
were largely driven by developments in the Japanese fishing and trade markets
(Whynott 1995). These methods were much more capital and gear-intensive, but
allowed fishers to take larger harvests and more fish per trip (Mather et al. 1995). By
the late 1960s, bluefin tuna were declining in the western Atlantic waters (Mather et
al. 1995). As a direct result of the increased attention to the declining stocks of bluefin
tuna, ICCAT was formed in 1966 (ICCAT 2006). In doing so, ICCAT became one of
the world’s first RFMOs, and the Convention Area was established as most of the
Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (ICCAT 2006, See Figure 7).

Figure 7. Map of RFMO jurisdictions; ICCAT jurisdiction is represented in orange.

FAO. 2012f. pg. 4.
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D. Development of Ranching in the Mediterranean Sea
The development of the bluefin tuna ranching, or aquaculture industry in the
Mediterranean Sea in the 1990s has important implications for how the eastern
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea fishery is managed. Ranching involves capturing wild
tuna and placing them in offshore net pens to be fattened, while aquaculture involves
growing bluefin tuna in captivity for their entire lives (Pew 2010). Juvenile bluefin
tuna are captured for fattening in pens almost exclusively by purse seines, because
they can capture entire schools of fish and transfer them to tow cages for transport to
stationary net pens at tuna ranches (Ehrenberg 2008, Pew 2010, See Figure 8).

Figure 8. A tow-cage transferring bluefin tuna to a net pen for fattening.

Image from ICIJ 2010. pg. 16.

The fish are fattened to increase the quality of their meat to obtain higher
prices in the market (FAO 2012d). The industry developed directly in response to
seasonal shortages of fatty bluefin tuna that fetch high prices at Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish

23	
  
	
  

	
  
Market (Issenberg 2007). Bluefin tuna are by far the most heavily farmed or ranched
fish in the Mediterranean Sea (FAO 2012d). Importantly, this industry is non-existent
in the western Atlantic Ocean because spawning aggregations that are required to
supply fish to the ranches do not occur nearshore as they do in the Mediterranean Sea
(Ehrenberg 2008). It is highly unlikely that this practice beginning in the western
Atlantic Ocean. Croatia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Malta currently lead production of
ranched bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea (FAO 2012d).

3. Demand of the Sushi Market Drives Bluefin Prices
The market for bluefin tuna meat is driven by the rapid expansion of the
world’s sushi industry since the 1970s, which relies upon the invention of flashfreezing technology, high-speed trucking, and logistical breakthroughs in overnight
flights to Tokyo (Bestor 2001, Issenberg 2007, NMFS 2010b). The most valuable
portion of the tuna, the honmaguro or kuromaguro, is the deep red, fat-marbled flesh
that is seen in sushi restaurants (Bestor 2001). Single bluefin tuna have sold for several
hundred thousand U.S. dollars in recent years (Collette et al. 2011).

4. Relative Stock Statuses of Eastern/Western Bluefin Tuna Stocks
The prime conservation problem for tunas is the depletion of... bluefin
(FAO 2012f pg. 4).
This section provides background information on the two stocks of Northern
Atlantic bluefin tuna, (western Atlantic and eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea) and
the relative health of each stock. There is considerable debate surrounding the
scientifically based stock status of ICCAT-managed bluefin tuna. On the one hand,
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the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the National
Geographic Society, popular media, and many other groups suggest that both stocks of
bluefin tuna are “endangered” throughout the ICCAT Convention Area (IUCN
“Redlist,” National Geographic Society 2012). On the other hand, there is a
perception among industry groups that there is no such decline (ABTA 2010).
Currently, the eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stock is both still overfished
and overfishing is still occurring (ICCAT 2010a, See Figure 9).

Figure 9. Estimates of eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea bluefin stock biomass.

Image from ICCAT 2012c, pg. 98. Note: Dashes indicate 80% confidence intervals.
This means that both the level fishing mortality (overfished) and level of
fishing effort (overfishing) remain too high to sustain Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY) in the long-term, which is ICCAT’s stated management goal for the stock
(ICCAT 2010a). Overfishing a stock means subjecting a stock to a fishing mortality
rate (F) that exceeds the fishing mortality rate associated with MSY (FMSY) (Hilborn
2005, Kell et al. 2012). The estimated mass of spawning-age adults is estimated to be
57% of the highest recorded levels in the past few decades for the Eastern
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Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stock (ICCAT 2010a). The stock biomass has not declined
to the degree seen the western Atlantic, but ranching and aquaculture operations as
well as significant latent fishing capacity in the form of many boats in port waiting to
fish make bluefin’s status in the Mediterranean Sea quite fragile (Porch 2005).
The western Atlantic stock is also overfished and overfishing is still occurring
(ICCAT 2010a). The spawning stock biomass of the western Atlantic stock is
currently estimated to be less than 30% of pre-1970 collapsed levels (ICCAT 2010a).
This biomass is too low to sustain MSY, and has caused considerable concern among
fisheries managers and conservation groups (ICCAT 2010a, See Figure 10, Table 5).

Figure 10. Estimates of western Atlantic bluefin tuna spawning stock biomass.

Image from ICCAT 2010c, pg. 76. Note: Dashes indicate 80% confidence intervals.
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Table 6. Summary of ICCAT-managed species’ stock status from stock assessments.
NON- TUNA
Stocks, Year
MSY in metric
Stock Status
SPECIES
Assessed
tonnes
Atlantic
Northern – 2010
13,000 – 14,000 Neither Stock Overfished,
Swordfish
Overfishing Not
Southern - 2010
15,000
Occurring
Mediterranean 2009
14,600
Overfished, Overfishing is
Swordfish
Occurring
Sailfish
Western – 2009
600 – 1,100
Western/Eastern Stocks
Overfished, Overfishing is
Eastern - 2009
1,250 – 1,950
Occurring
White Marlin 2006
600 – 1,300
Overfished, Overfishing is
Occurring
Blue Marlin
2011
1,000 – 2,400
Overfished, Overfishing is
Occurring
Tuna
Species
Albacore
Thunnus
alalunga

Stocks, Year
Assessed
Northern - 2009

MSY or Proxy in
metric tonnes
29,000

Southern - 2011

23,000 – 98,000

Mediterranean – 2011 No MSY proxy
Bigeye
Thunnus
obesus
Bluefin
Thunnus
thynnus
Skipjack
Katsuwonus
pelamis
Yellowfin
Thunnus
albacares
Small Tunas
Group

2010

78,000 – 102,000

Western – 2010

2,500

Eastern/
Mediterranean –
2010
Western – 2008

13,500

Eastern/
Mediterranean - 2008
2011

143,000 – 170,000

No assessment
available

No MSY proxy

30,000 – 36,000

115,000 – 145,000

Data from ICCAT 2012a.
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Stock Status
Northern/Southern
Stocks Overfished,
Overfishing
Occurring
Mediterranean Stock
Status Unknown
Not Overfished,
Overfishing Not
Occurring
Eastern/Western
Stocks Overfished,
Overfishing
Occurring
Neither Stock
Overfished,
Overfishing Not
Occurring
Overfished,
Overfishing Not
Occurring
Stock Status
Unknown

	
  
Importantly, bluefin tuna is the only ICCAT species for which all of its stocks
are overfished and currently experiencing overfishing (ICCAT 2010a).

5. Common Explanations for Complex Management of Bluefin Tuna
The biological peculiarities of bluefin, their high market value, political
pressures, history of management, and capital-intensive fisheries make them unique
and particularly vulnerable to overexploitation because mature adults can be targeted
in large schools during spawning migrations to known areas year after year (Porch
2005, Webster 2011). Several common theories in fisheries economics and
management literature seek to explain the management framework in place for, and
decline of, bluefin tuna; these common explanations are the foundation of this thesis.
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
A common argument for why bluefin tuna stocks have generally declined and
for their unique management is rooted in Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”
(Hardin 1968). This idea is pervasive in economics literature, the popular media, and
even marine resource management literature (Nickler 1999, McWhinnie 2006, Revkin
2008 in The New York Times, The Economist 2008, Sumaila and Huang 2012). A
simple Internet search for the terms “tragedy of the commons, bluefin tuna” returns
nearly 8,000 results. Many of these are publications on conservation organizations’
websites, teachers’ lessons, marine conservation blogs, and respected international
sources of information such as the UK’s Guardian and The New York Times.
The widely accepted primary reason for the current state of this stock is
its common property and shared stock status, which together can easily drive
exploiters of a given natural resource into non-cooperative behaviour, known
as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Sumaila and Huang 2012, pg. 502).
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Applying the “Tragedy of the Commons” idea to explain decline in bluefin
tuna fisheries is inappropriate, however (Buck-Cox 1985, Hanna 1990). ICCAT
member countries are clear user groups that adopt management measures to govern
the collective actions of the group of fishers. Bluefin tuna fishing has existed since the
tonnara operated in Roman times, and governance structures have continuously
shaped these practices (Maggio 2000, Longo and Clausen 2011). ICCAT has also
rebuilt overfished swordfish stocks using similar management tools to those used in
the bluefin fishery, which highlights that a “tragedy” or collapse of the resource is not
imminent (ICCAT 2008).
Some academics contribute the decline of bluefin tuna instead to the species’
extremely high market value. They argue that cultural norms to “leave fish for the next
year” that regulated how traditional tonnara and other fishing methods that have
operated for millennia have been undermined by capitalistic forces (Maggio 2000,
Longo and Clausen 2011). Further, they argue that changing fisheries for Atlantic
bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean Sea reflect the “Tragedy of the Commodity”:
Modern ABFT production, born of capitalist private property and the unending
quest to maximize surplus value, became the form-determinant of fishing
methods, technology, and the labor process in the modern era, resulting in a
host of social and ecological contradictions (Longo and Clausen 2011, pg. 324).
Under this explanation, the high market prices paid for bluefin tuna led directly
to the development of capital- and technology-intensive modern fisheries for the
species as well as government subsidies throughout the EU and Mediterranean
countries (Foster et al. 2010). Too many boats are built to catch decreasing numbers
of fish each year (Miyake and Kebe 1996, Clausen et al. 2011, FAO 2012a). Industry
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groups pressure their respective governments for higher quotas to cover the high
capital costs they sink into the fishery, and governments respond with subsidies and
pressure on ICCAT Commissioners to push for TACs that are much higher than the
scientifically-based TAC recommended by the ICCAT SCRS (ICIJ 2010, Longo and
Clausen 2011). Against this backdrop, bluefin tuna TAC allocations and management
became a much larger battle over continuation of cultural practices, food security, and
employment (Longo and Clausen 2011). In addition, high market prices of bluefin
from the expanding popularity of sushi led to infusion of international capital and
intense marketing campaigns that allowed the bluefin tuna became a “boutique
species” (Safina 2001) that has low use value but high market value (Issenberg 2007).
A third argument has been put forward that suggests that the best available
science on which ICCAT purports to base its management decisions has been highly
politicized. Some argue that the leading scientific advice over time has been
undermined, ignored, or even shelved before becoming public or presented at ICCAT
meetings in response to political pressure within member country delegations
(Whynott 1995, Fromentin and Powers 2005, Porch 2005, MacKenzie et al. 2008).
Further, the same authors argue that imperfect or incomplete science has been seized,
co-opted, and exploited by various interest groups to argue for or against specific
management changes (Whynott 1995, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Ruais 2011):
We hypothesize that authorities have been unwilling or unable to resist
political pressure by the bluefin tuna fishing industry to implement
recommended measures... (MacKenzie et al. 2008, pg. 30).
A fourth argument hinges upon the idea that “free-riders,” or parties that are
not party to ICCAT and disregard management rules, undermine the effectiveness of
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conserving the resource and drive depletion of bluefin tuna (McWhinnie 2006). There
are several examples of “free riders” engaged in bluefin tuna fishing in the Eastern
Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea such as Bolivia and Georgia, so this theory has a
factual basis (McWhinnie 2006, Pew 2010, Ruais 2011). Catches of bluefin tuna from
free riders make up a small percentage of the estimated IUU fishing in a given year,
whereas IUU fishing from CPCs can be very large (Pew 2010, ICIJ 2010).
The fact that bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea
constitute a resource that is shared among 48 CPCs and 5 Cooperating Non-Members
makes their management particularly difficult to coordinate. In a 2010 book on
international environmental governance, Conca and Dabelko summarize the challenge
that all RFMOs like ICCAT face:
Just as state sovereignty imposes a pattern of political authority that does
not correspond exactly to the underlying ecological reality, so transnational
capitalism imposes patterns of economic activity that do not wholly
correspond to the prevailing pattern of political authority. Both features
of system structure give environmental problems an inherently transnational
dimension, and both greatly complicate the prospects for global cooperation.
(Conca and Dabelko 2010, pg. 59).
These four common explanations will be reviewed for their merit and
appropriateness for helping to describe the current overfished status of both stocks of
bluefin tuna and the reasons for adoption of specific management tools in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER III. ICCAT MANAGEMENT OF BLUEFIN TUNA
1. History of ICCAT Management
A. ICCAT History and Fisheries Management Framework
Understanding ICCAT itself is essential to grasping its methods of
management. After urging from the FAO Fisheries Governing Body in 1966, the
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas was signed and entered into force
in 1969 (ICCAT 2011a). The Preamble of the Convention states ICCAT’s goal:
...to co-operate in maintaining the populations of [tuna] at levels which
will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes
(ICCAT 2011a in Foreword).
The objective of sustaining maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is a common
goal of many fisheries management regimes (FAO 2012d). The goal is to harvest a
species at about half of the total biomass their environment can sustain for that species
because stock growth rate is highest at that point (See Figure 10).
Figure 11. Diagram showing the theoretical point intersection of maximum growth in
biomass (on the x-axis) and corresponding MSY (on the y-axis) of a fish stock.

From: ICCAT 2012i, Figure 9 pg. 64.
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ICCAT is comprised of 48 Contracting Party Countries, including several
parties that are not even adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean, making it the largest RFMO in
the world (ICCAT 2011a, See Table 6).

Table 7. CPCs and cooperating fishing entities involved in ICCAT.
CPCs and Cooperators

Status

United States, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, Canada, France* (on
behalf of St-Pierre et Miquelon), Brazil, Morocco, Republic of
Korea, Cote D’Ivoire, Angola, Russia, Gabon, Cape Verde,
Uruguay, Sao Tome e Principe, Venezuela, Equatorial Guinea,
Republic of Guinea, United Kingdom* (on behalf of the Oceanic
Territories), Libya, People’s Republic of China, Croatia,
European Union, Tunisia, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago,
Namibia, Barbados, Honduras, Algeria, Mexico, Vanuatu,
Iceland, Turkey, Philippines, Norway, Nicaragua, Guatemala,
Senegal, Belize, Syria, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Nigeria,
Egypt, Albania, Sierra Leone, and Mauritania

48 Contracting
Parties. Any
United
Nations
country,
specialized
UN agency, or
intergovernmental
economic
organization
may join
ICCAT
5 Cooperating
Chinese Taipei, Guyana, Curacao, Colombia, and Suriname
NonContracting
Parties, or
Fishing
Entities in
ICCAT
Cuba, Benin, Spain**, Portugal**, Italy**, Cyprus**, and
7 CPCs are no
Malta** are no longer Contracting Parties due to accession of the longer active
European Community to ICCAT in 2004 (ICCAT 2012g).
in ICCAT
Data from ICCAT 2012g. Note: France and the UK represent St. Pierre et Miquelon &
Ascension Island, respectively, and are denoted with an asterisk (*). All other
European Union (EU) Member Parties are superseded in this Convention as a result of
agreements with the European Community and are denoted with a double asterisk (**)

B. ICCAT-Managed Species
ICCAT manages over thirty species of fish and sharks (ICCAT 2012f, See Table 7).
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Table 8. Major ICCAT managed species.
ICCAT Managed Species’ Common Name
Atlantic bluefin tuna
Skipjack tuna
Yellowfin tuna

Species’ Scientific Name
Thunnus thynnus
Katsuwonus pelamis
Thunnus albacares

Albacore tuna
Bigeye tuna
Black skipjack tuna
Frigate tuna

Thunnus alalunga
Thunnus obesus
Euthynnus alletteratus
Auxis thazard

Atlantic bonito
Swordfish
White marlin
Blue marlin

Sarda sarda
Xiphias gladius
Tetrapturus albidus
Makaira nigricans

Sailfish
Spearfish
Spanish mackerel
King mackerel

Istiophorus albicans
Tetrapturus pfluegeri
Scomberomorus maculatus
Scomberomorus cavalla

Data from ICCAT 2012f in “Introduction.”
C. Structure and Specific Responsibilities of ICCAT
ICCAT is responsible for the conservation of tunas in the Atlantic Ocean and
adjacent seas, which it achieves through collecting and disseminating fisheries
statistics and data, coordinating research, and developing management plans. ICCAT’s
area of jurisdiction, or Convention Area, encompasses all of the Atlantic Ocean and
the Mediterranean Sea (ICCAT 2006). The ICCAT organization itself is made up of a
Commission body, a secretariat headquartered in Madrid, permanent Working Groups,
and four Panels (ICCAT 2012b). A Standing Committee on Research and Statistics
(SCRS) provides the Commission with impartial, objective scientific information to
frame discussions over recommendations and resolutions that the Commission may
choose to enact (Porch 2005, ICCAT 2012b). The SCRS is comprised of CPC
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scientists, and their peer-reviewed findings are presented to ICCAT to inform harvest
decisions and TAC allocations (ICCAT 2012b). Formal Recommendations and
Resolutions are also based upon these publications and findings (ICCAT 2012b).
ICCAT has four permanent committees: the Standing Committee on Research
and Statistics (SCRS); Standing Committee on Finance and Administration;
Conservation and Management Measures Compliance Committee; and Permanent
Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures
(ICCAT 2012b). Four Panels discuss a species group or specific species (ICCAT
2012a). Panel 1 concerns tropical tunas such as skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye; Panel
2 deals with northern temperate tunas including Northern albacore and Northern
Atlantic bluefin tuna; Panel 3 works with southern temperate tunas such as Southern
albacore and swordfish; and Panel 4 advises on all other species, such as bycatch
species (ICCAT 2012g, NMFS 2012a).

2. ICCAT’s Two-Stock Hypothesis
A. History of the 2-Stock Hypothesis
Though the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna is one species that inhabits the
entirety of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, ICCAT has been managing the
fishery as if it were composed of two separate stocks ever since the 1980s (Porch
2005). This peculiarity is due to the fact that ICCAT scientists assumed that migrating
bluefin return annually to spawning grounds they have used before, which may not be
accurate (ICCAT 1995). The majority of bluefin tuna catch was made close to either
side of the Atlantic Ocean in those years, making this management arrangement
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convenient (ICCAT 1995, Mather et al. 1995). As a result of this convenience, a
management boundary line was drawn at the 45-degree meridian to separate the
Eastern Atlantic /Mediterranean Sea stock from the Western Atlantic stock (Mather et
al. 1995. Whynott 1995, ICCAT 1995, See Figure 11).

Figure 12. Illustration of ICCAT’s east-west management boundary line (in bold).

Image from ICCAT 2012f, pg. 90.
The line is somewhat arbitrary and not reflective of the actual biology of the
species, which frequently swim beyond this political boundary (Whynott 1995, Porch
2005). According to an ICCAT report from a 2001 workshop on bluefin “mixing,” or
swimming across the management boundary:
The dividing line was based on the distribution of catches and some notion
of the midpoints between the continents (ICCAT 2010a, pg. 367).
B. Eastern or Western Stock? Why does it Matter?
The debate over the accuracy of the two-stock hypothesis is a critical one for
bluefin tuna management because ICCAT CPCs share a portion of the total TAC, or
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quota, of each stock. Imagine the two “stocks” (eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea
and western Atlantic) as two pies that when combined represent the total ICCAT
bluefin TAC in a fishing season. The western Atlantic stock, or pie, is small and
shared by three countries: the U.S., Canada, and Japan. The Eastern
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea pie is about five times the size, because bluefin are more
abundant there, and is shared among dozens of countries. When a party catches a
bluefin in a specific area of the Convention Area, it gets counted as a slice against that
specific pie. If that individual fish was not actually born on the side of the
management boundary where it was caught, then the counting is inaccurate, and the
pies are no longer divided equitably as they were intended by ICCAT.
Due to the uncertain degree of mixing of bluefin tuna over the Convention
Area, parties can become adversarial over perceived inequities in allocation of the
valuable bluefin tuna resource (Porch 2005). If scientists attribute an incorrect
proportion of fish caught to one stock or the other, then stock assessments for both
sides become compromised because the total TAC shares are no longer divided up
based on relative sizes of each stock. ICCAT’s SCRS acknowledges the problems that
this mixing can introduce for managers:
...even small rates of mixing from East to West can have significant effects
on the West due to the fact that Eastern plus Mediterranean resource is much
larger than that of the West (ICCAT 2012a, pg. 85).
3. ICCAT Management Context
A. Managing a Migratory Species
Bluefin are a highly migratory species, or a “straddling stock” as they are
known in international legal regimes, and they swim beyond national jurisdictions in
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the form of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (UN LOS Convention III 1982, United
Nations Conference Conf.A. 164/38, 1995). When fish swim beyond the boundaries
of any one state in the open ocean, or into the “High Seas,” they are managed
exclusively by ICCAT (ICCAT 2011a). While an estimated 90% of commercial and
recreational fish are caught within EEZs of states, the bluefin tuna fishery doesn’t
follow this pattern, making its management complex (Juda 2008). Specific fishery
management tools are required to manage such transboundary stocks (Weber 2002).	
  

B. Stock Management Measures
ICCAT has applied many fishery management tools to limit fishing effort and
constrain total catch of both stocks in the bluefin tuna fishery (ICCAT 2012b, Table
5). Different tools employed for the eastern and western stocks (See Tables 8 and 9).

Table 9. Overview of western Atlantic management tools.
WESTERN ATLANTIC MEASURES
Recommendation
Year - Number
1974-01
1982-01
1991-01
1993-05
1996-04
1998-07

Measure Type

Measure Goal

Minimum Size
Closed
Season/Area
National Shares
of TAC
Certification
Scheme
Research SetAside
Rebuilding Plan

Reduce juvenile mortality
Protect spawning aggregations in Gulf of
Mexico
Percentage sharing of TAC among CPCs
and Cooperating Non-Members
Reduce sale of IUU fish, reduce total catch
in fishery
Portion of annual quota dedicated to
scientific research program
Rebuild Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) to
levels that support MSY by 2019

Data from ICCAT 2012b.
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Table 10. Overview of eastern Atlantic management tools.
EASTERN ATLANTIC/MEDITERRANEAN SEA MEASURES
Measure Year, #

Measure Type

Measure Goal

1992-01

Catch
Certification
Closed
Season/Area
Capacity
Reduction
Research SetAside
Minimum Size
Limit
National Shares
of TAC
Stock Rebuilding
Plan
Farming Capacity
Reduction
TAC Overages
Payback Program

Certify origin of landed fish to accurately
allocate quota shares, reduce IUU fishing
Mediterranean Sea closed to longlining,
reduces mortality in Tyrrhenian Sea
Reduce fishing effort to 1995 levels,
reduce catch by 25% from those years
Allocate quota share for scientific tagging
research program
Reduce juvenile mortality

Mandatory Trade
Reporting
Requirement
2008-06
Multilateral Trade
Sanctions
2009-06
Capacity
Reduction
Data from ICCAT 2012b.

Mandatory declaration of farmed bluefin
trade from CPCs, Cooperating NonMembers to reduce IUU fishing
Reduce IUU fishing, activities that
undermine ICCAT management
“Drastic reductions in fishing capacity for
all Parties” (ICCAT 2010b pg.5).

1993-07
1994-11
1995-04
1996-03
1998-05
2006-05
2006-07
2007-04
2007-10

Percentage sharing of TAC among CPCs
and Cooperating Non-Members
Rebuild Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB)
to levels that support MSY by 2023
Better monitoring of total catch, transfer
of tuna to net-pens, reduce IUU fishing
Allow over-quota catches in one year to
be repaid with lower allocation in future

Unique management tools are used in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea
to constrain effort, reduce fishing and farming or ranching capacity, and to reign in
total catch (Porch 2005). Due to these unique threats to the eastern stock stemming
from ranching and high levels of IUU fishing, there is a corresponding increase in the
number and type of management measures employed to govern that fishery (Pew
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2010, ICIJ 2010). These tools help to address the transfer of illegally caught fish to
pens and ranches in the Mediterranean Sea, which has been identified by ICCAT as
critical to reducing IUU fishing and increasing the health of the eastern bluefin stock
by ICCAT (ICCAT 2012a). This is partially due to the fact that at-sea transfers of
bluefin do not count toward a country’s share of the TAC, only landed fish do.
Further, illegal catch of undersized and immature tuna to supply the ranching pens
significantly undermines ICCAT’s ability to forecast availability of mature, spawning
fish necessary to support maximum sustainable yield of the fishery (ICCAT 2012a).

4. Politics Surrounding Bluefin Tuna
A. Political Pressure Affects Bluefin Tuna Management
Bluefin is an emblematic example of a shared stock and this creates a tricky
political context...the main challenge for the conservation and management of
this stock is nowadays more political than scientific... (Fromentin and Fonteneau
2002, pg. 74).
Each CPC has its own motivations for engaging in bluefin fisheries; this
situation causes political tension between states that want to halt the decline of bluefin
tuna worldwide and the states that catch, ranch, and sell tuna. For example, recent
high unemployment in countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece, renders little political
support for enforcing rules that would keep boats and fishermen in port in these
countries (Sumaila and Huang 2012). These countries often pay large sums to
developing states like Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt in order to catch portions of their
allocated tuna quotas to keep their large fishing industries working during hard
economic times (Sumaila and Huang 2012, European Commission on Fisheries 2012).
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Small-scale tuna fishers and operators of fish traps claim they wish to continue
traditional fishing practices as part of a cultural identity (Roesti 1966, Maggio 2000).
The complex interplay of these factors create pressure that impacts bluefin tuna stocks
perhaps more than any other stock under ICCAT’s management. According to one
ICCAT scientist, “There was just no political will to enforce the rules” of setting
reduced TACs in the face of these economic and cultural considerations in the late
1990s to mid-2000s, which contributed to bluefin stock declines (ICIJ 2010, pg. 8).

B. Bluefin Tuna as a Special Status Species
The large size, wide migrations, over-exploited status, charisma, popularity,
economic importance, recognition, and high demand in the sushi industry have helped
bluefin tuna achieve an elevated status (Doyle et al. 1995, Leader-Williams and
Dublin 2000, Entwistle and Dunstone 2000, Sergio et al. 2008, ICCAT 2008, MartinLopez et al. 2009, Collette 2011). Non-scientific information can play a crucial role in
conservation initiatives and legal status of a species, as it has with bluefin tuna (Safina
and Klinger 2001, Worm and Duffy 2003, Martin-Lopez et al. 2009). Conservation
biology literature notes that listing a species as “threatened” or “endangered” of
extinction in national or international arenas is linked with such “iconic” species that
capture humans’ attention and imagination (Ray 2005, Sergio et al. 2008, MartinLopez et al. 2009, Collette 2011). As a result of this elevated status, conservation
groups now “pursue protective measures [for bluefin] with a zeal usually reserved for
whales” (Porch 2005, pg. 364). This status, however, has important policy
implications, both positive and negative (Weber 2002, Webster 2011).
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Bluefin tuna have become a powerful policy symbol of overfishing and the
need for conservation over the past few decades as a result of their “iconic,”
“charismatic” attributes. Policy symbols can be used to unite and promote and effect
change (Brunner 1987). They can help lead to issue expansion, whereby an issue takes
on a more important, prominent role than it once had because different advocacy
coalitions rally around it for a specific cause to try to garner support for their specific
position (Brunner 1987, Yanow 1993, Harvey 1994). In addition, symbols can help an
issue such as overfishing obtain meaning by communicating the complex science
involved with a simple image (Yanow 1993). They can also help create consensus on
issues, such as “overfished” status of species or the need for conservation, and lead to
rapid opinion formation on an issue (Brunner 1987). Finally, policy symbols can also
be used to exploit, coerce, subvert, or de-emphasize the empirical or scientific
understanding of a subject and overemphasize the social understanding of an issue
depending on the perceptions of those involved in creating the symbol (Appleyard
1979, Brunner 1987). This can be especially problematic for an international symbol
such as the bluefin tuna, because different cultural meanings from across the
Convention Area can become attached to it (Yanow 1993).
In the context of the bluefin tuna management policy problem, the symbolism
associated with bluefin tuna has changed considerably over time. Ancient Phoenician
and other Mediterranean cultures put bluefin tuna images on the opposite side of coins
stamped with the epic hero Hercules to represent the power, bounty, and wonder of the
sea (Maggio 2000). Recently, environmental and NGO groups can use the symbol of
the beleaguered bluefin tuna to argue for broader changes within ICCAT and fisheries
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management in general. Groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, Oceana,
Greenpeace International, Pew Environment Group, and others now use the image of
bluefin tuna as a symbol of overexploitation of fisheries and marine resources more
generally. This strong symbolism has been used to evoke a sense of wonder and awe
in people concerned about species conservation and effective fisheries management,
which potentially attracts non-scientific explanations and information on the subject
(Yanow 1993). It helped fuel the recognition of the troubled plight of bluefin tuna in
popular media over time, as well as recent pushes to ban trade on the species in the
United States and internationally. This will be discussed more in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER IV. THESIS METHODOLOGY
1. Literature Review Methodology to Test Six Hypotheses
A. ICCAT Management Regime Comparison
In this Chapter, I describe the literature review and key informant interview
methods used to analyze documents and extract insights from key informant interview
transcripts to test the following hypotheses about the factors that contribute to the
management of bluefin tuna:
1. High market value of bluefin tuna meat does not fully account for the
unique management of this species.
2. Individual market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishing
industry are not greater in proportion to the special management attention this
species receives compared to other ICCAT-managed fisheries.
3. Bluefin tuna have achieved an “iconic” or “charismatic” status in popular
media, peer-reviewed literature, and in non-governmental group
publications that other ICCAT-managed stocks have not.
4. This “iconic” status contributes to the management approaches adopted by
ICCAT to manage this species differently than others, and has important
implications for both the resource and the fishing industry.
5. Non-scientific information and political pressure play a major role in
influencing which management tools are adopted at ICCAT meetings, and a
disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is afforded to
bluefin tuna.
6. Media scrutiny and heightened status of the bluefin tuna affects ICCAT’s
ability to effectively manage the species.
To explore these hypotheses, I first compiled and compared the management
measures used to regulate the bluefin tuna fishery to those of used to manage the
ICCAT-managed fisheries for bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna. These
fisheries were utilized as useful comparison subjects because they represent the
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bluefin’s closest peers in terms of value, size, and attributes of the fisheries. To do
this, I reviewed ICCAT reports of management measures for each stock. This
methodology is similar to Krippendorff’s qualitative content analysis, which he
summarizes as a collection of methods of examining communication that yield
inferences from verbal, illustrative, and symbolic information (Krippendorff 2013). I
used this methodology to draw insights and make explanatory comments about the
discourse and messages communicated in literature to assess my six hypotheses. I
focused on ICCAT published documents, NGO reports, and academic publications as
the major sources for my literature review. I compared quantitative data where
appropriate, such as comparing relative numbers of management actions used for a
specific fishery, but focused mainly on qualitative presentation of information.

B. Comparing Relative Market Value of ICCAT-Managed Fisheries
To address my first two hypotheses, I needed to compile ICCAT data on the
relative scale and fleet size in each fishery as well as market data. Since high prices
are cited as a reason for different ICCAT management, I wanted to find out if bluefin
tuna fishery was actually the most valuable one managed by ICCAT. There are no
comparative analyses of the market value of all ICCAT fisheries that are publicly
available, so I had to piece together one of my own that was consistent. To assess
market value, I calculated and compared the estimated value of bluefin fisheries to
those for bigeye and yellowfin tuna and swordfish, because those fisheries are most
similar to the bluefin fishery in terms of size of fleets, methods, and areas where the
fisheries are focused. To estimate the relative market value of these fisheries within
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the ICCAT Convention Area, I first summarized which methods of capture accounted
for the majority of catch in each one based on ICCAT’s published summary reports.
Then, I used ICCAT’s official Record of Vessels to compare number of vessels
actively engaged in the fishery for each species to get an idea of the Convention-wide
scale of each fishery. This rough comparative tool is not meant to be precise, but is
intended to illustrate relative economic importance of the fisheries for each species.
In order to complete a useful comparative analysis, I used the number of
vessels involved in unique fisheries as a proxy for effort in the ICCAT Convention
Area for the bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna fisheries. I took into account
the fact that ICCAT only requires accurate accounting of vessels in the Mediterranean
Sea, not throughout the rest of the Convention Area. This skews the fishing effort data
considerably for swordfish, bigeye tuna, and yellowfin tuna, whose fisheries are
mostly prosecuted outside of the Mediterranean Sea and on the eastern side of the
Atlantic Ocean. Despite these limitations, this approach provides a reasonable
estimate of size and effort involved in the fisheries because no other relevant data
sources are accurately compiled or publicly available (Miyake and Kebe 1996).
These data on the number of vessels and CPCs actively involved in each
fishery were gathered to complement market data from Madrid’s Fish Market,
Mercamadrid, to estimate the total market value of each fishery to help address my
research questions. Actual market prices for ICCAT-managed species were obtained
from this fish market because it is the second largest in the world and it lies at the
center of the Convention Area. Market data from Tokyo’s Tsukiji Fish Market were
not available for this assessment. I used market data for bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna,
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swordfish, and yellowfin tuna to summarize the average price in U.S. dollars per
kilogram of fish from the Convention Area, which I multiplied by the most current
legal MSY or proxy (measured in metric tonnes) provided by ICCAT’s website to
obtain an estimate of the total relative market value of each fishery. In this estimate of
relative value of ICCAT-managed fisheries, I assumed that all else but the market
price and average size of these species is equal.

C. Assessing Effects of Bluefin Tuna’s Special Status on its Management
To assess the special status that bluefin tuna have attained and its impacts in
hypotheses 3 and 4, I reviewed conservation biology literature and environmental
NGO and conservation group publications, and created a tool with which to gauge
bluefin tuna’s “iconic” and “charismatic” status. I summarized conservation biology
literature on charismatic megafauna and its impacts on conservation to compile a list
of attributes that all such species have in common. Next, I examined the records of
five influential journals in the field of fisheries conservation to get a sense of the body
of published research on bluefin tuna compared to other ICCAT-managed stocks. I
examined the records of the journals Science, Nature, Fisheries Research, Marine
Policy, Ecology and Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment from 1964, or as long
as the journals have been published, to present. I chose five journals to act as a rough
illustration of the publishing popularity of each species out of practical considerations.
I could have examined the records of dozens of journals, but my intent here is merely
illustrative. I assessed their relative importance in terms of the number of times these
journals have been cited in the documents I used for my literature review.
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Finally, I relied on a combination of literature review and interviews to assess
hypotheses 5 and 6. I extracted information from each to create a chronological
narrative of the special status bluefin tuna have attained since the 1970s through the
influence of interest groups. I qualitatively assessed some of the relative pressure
these groups have put on ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna through various domestic and
international conservation vehicles such as the U.S. Endangered Species Act to gauge
this assessment. I also examined how non-scientific information has played into these
efforts and affects how ICCAT adopts various management measures.

2. Key Informant Semi-Structured Interview Methodology
A. Background
I used a semi-structured interview methodology to test my hypotheses about
why bluefin tuna are managed differently than other ICCAT-managed stocks that
reflect current popular beliefs. Semi-structured, purposive interviews are not useful for
generalizing about populations on a large scale, but are effective at offering general
impressions and insights into a particular issue by offering flexibility with how
questions are asked (Tremblay 1957, Bernard 2006, Dalton 2006). This methodology
suits my purposes in this study, because this research requires qualitative information
and targeted sampling of specialized knowledge that relatively few individuals hold.
This methodology afforded me the flexibility to progressively re-structure questions to
probe various aspects of a respondent’s specific topical knowledge (Bernard 2006).
I compared findings from the literature review to the themes that emerged in
the interviews while keeping in mind that not all interviews would provide me with a
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perfect sample of information. Some key informants have more firsthand expertise
about some topics than others, and even people with the same level of experience on
an issue may have different perceptions of the same idea or experience (Bernard
2006). To address this, I sought to interview key informants from a pool of thirty
people that are intimately familiar with Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna management
and the ICCAT management process from a United States perspective. I contacted
fifteen experts (50% of the total pool) with a generic email explaining my intent to
conduct semi-structured, confidential key informant interviews to assist me in my
research as well as a formal, voluntary Consent to Participate Form explaining the
research project in detail (See Appendices I and II). The respondents represent every
interest group with representation on the U.S. ICCAT delegation. I interviewed the
twelve potential informants that responded, making my response rate 80% and
securing a representative sample of 80% of the total pool.

B. Choosing Key Informants
I chose to interview U.S.-based bluefin tuna experts that have attended at least
one ICCAT General Meeting or Special Meeting in the last decade. I reached out to
interview only U.S. bluefin tuna management experts out of expediency. Since
ICCAT is the largest RFMO, there are hundreds of individuals representing over fifty
countries with a working knowledge of their management, but language barriers and
practical considerations prevented me from contacting them for this research. The next
logical step in making this study more representative of perspectives of other ICCAT
members would have been to interview experts from Japan and the EU, the other two
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most influential bluefin tuna fishing nations. However, language barriers and practical
concerns made taking this next step difficult and unviable for this thesis research.
The respondents I interviewed serve as a useful representation of the many
different groups and interests involved in ICCAT meetings from a U.S. perspective,
but perhaps not ICCAT as a whole. I chose these participants from lists of U.S.
ICCAT delegations to the ICCAT Annual Meetings from the U.S. National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS 2012). In this regard, my interview methods are
representative in that I interviewed a representative of every major interest group
listed that takes part in ICCAT meetings as part of the official U.S. delegation
(Bernard 2006). The U.S. delegation is one of the most influential at ICCAT
meetings, and their scientists and NGO representatives help provide the science that
drives management decisions on bluefin tuna (Weber 2002, Ruais 2012). Therefore, it
is valuable to sample U.S.-based experts as I have here.

C. Conducting Key Informant Interviews, Compiling Results
After initial emails were sent to potential key informants, I began interviewing
twelve respondents that had read, signed, and returned the Consent to Participate Form
that took place between November and December 2012. During phone interviews that
each lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour and fifteen minutes, I asked
respondents a prepared list of seven questions and additional questions about their
years of experience in bluefin tuna management issues and any specialized fisheries
expertise they may have (See Appendix III).
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I transcribed the interview responses by hand, and typed them immediately
after each interview had been completed. I created a spreadsheet to compile and
organize interview responses. Rather than use direct quotations from key informants
that might betray their identities in this confidential study, I grouped similar responses
together based on keywords and overarching themes. I split up responses to each
question by respondent, and looked for common themes or general trends. I organized
transcripts from each interview and developed a structured coding scheme to identify
themes of contributing factors of bluefin management (Bernard 2006). The coding
scheme was grounded in either ICCAT management tools or emerging themes from
the literature review using grounded theory interpretation techniques (Bernard 2006,
Matchar et al. 2006).
For questions referring to specific management tools or approaches, I grouped
responses according to tools identified in ICCAT documents. For questions referring
to perceptions or impacts of these tools, I used my own value judgments based on my
literature review to group them into impact themes. I used keywords to group these
responses, which is admittedly an imperfect and non-subjective component of my
coding methods. However, a reasonable person that had conducted a literature review
would be led to similar coding choices, making my methods and results realistically
repeatable. Then, I aggregated general impressions from the notes and compared them
to the responses of the group as a whole in a qualitative manner. Since the sample size
was relatively small for this study (n = 12), I avoided percentage breakdowns of
frequency of responses. I summarized how many participants responded a certain way
to each question, and present these results in Chapter V.
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D. Comparing Respondents’ Input with Literature Review
I compared the literature review findings with respondents’ insights to
determine if my hypotheses were supported or rejected. The usefulness of these
exercises lies in the insight they provide into the complexities and difficulties of
managing Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna within the ICCAT-management framework
while dispelling common misperceptions about bluefin tuna management. This is
particularly valuable for those generally interested in fisheries management.
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS
1. Hypothesis Testing
A. Hypotheses 1, 2: Market Value, Fleet Size, and Scale of Bluefin Fishery
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the results of content analysis and
interview responses in the same order as my hypotheses are listed. Hypothesis 1
questions whether the high market value of bluefin tuna meat fully accounts for the
unique management of bluefin tuna. Similarly, Hypothesis 2 posits that both the
individual market value of individual fish, fleet size, and scale of the fishery for
bluefin across the ICCAT Convention Area are not greater in proportion to the special
management attention this species receives.
To assess the relative market value and create a proxy for the relative scale of
the bluefin tuna fishery, I summarized the number of vessels officially registered with
ICCAT to pursue bigeye tuna, bluefin tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna in the
Convention Area (ICCAT 2011b, See Table 10).

Table 11. Summary of registered numbers of vessels in four ICCAT fisheries.
ICCAT-Managed Species
Registered Number of Vessels in Fishery
Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna

1,277**

Bluefin Tuna

1,012*

Swordfish

12,600**

ICCAT 2011d. Note: These numbers represent catching-vessels only. * Denotes a
fishery where the reported vessels account for a majority of catch of that species.
** Denotes a fishery where the reported vessels do not account for a majority of catch
of that species; the fishery is mostly prosecuted elsewhere in the Convention Area.
For this comparison, I ignored the numbers of processing and transport ships
involved in these fisheries for this comparison, because these vessels are often

53	
  
	
  

	
  
engaged in multiple fisheries (ICCAT 2011d). Also, the majority of the fishery for
bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tunas is prosecuted outside the Mediterranean
Sea, which contrasts with the fishery for bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2011d). I provide
evidence here that market value, fleet size, and scale of the bluefin tuna fishery is not
greater than those of fisheries for other ICCAT-managed species, and is not currently
in proportion to the magnitude of management attention it receives.
Estimating total value of these fisheries is complicated by considerable
multiplier effects of economic factors such as labor, travel, lodging, bait, ice, gear, and
other costs that are highly variable, diverse, and largely unreported among the various
fleets for these four species (ICIJ 2010). I avoid complex economic analysis of these
forces and instead compiled June 2012 average price data (in U.S. Dollars per
kilogram) of various ICCAT species below to illustrate market value of these fisheries
(FIS 2012, VASEP 2012). I chose to use June data because this was the most recent
data available at the time, and I wanted to reflect the relatively high seasonal prices of
bluefin tuna that are paid in the summer months (Issenberg 2007, See Table 11).

Table 12. Average actual market prices of ICCAT-managed species, in $US/kg, from
Mercamadrid, Spain, in June 2012.
ICCAT Species, Market Product
Average Price ($US/kg)
Bullet/Frigate Tuna, Whole
$2.10 – 2.75
Swordfish, Gutted Whole
$14.42 - 18.92
Yellowfin Tuna, Whole
$4.81 - 6.32
Albacore Tuna, Whole
$6.61 – 8.68
Bigeye Tuna, Whole*
$8.46 – 9.36
Bluefin, Gutted, Head Off*
$11.82 – 16.58
Data from FIS 2012. *Bigeye and bluefin tuna price data were originally recorded in
Japanese Yen in reports on their market value and then converted using June 2012
exchange rates of for the Japanese Yen to the U.S. Dollar.
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From this compiled data, gutted and beheaded bluefin tuna were more valuable
than any other tuna species, but were about 20% less valuable than whole gutted
swordfish in the summer of 2012 (FIS 2012). This simple market analysis represents
only a snapshot in time of the very complex tuna trading industry, but nonetheless
supports Hypothesis 1 and provides further evidence to support Hypothesis 2. The
available average market prices paid for each ICCAT species is compiled along with
each species’ ICCAT-mandated MSY or proxy in metric tonnes (See Table 12).

Table 13. ICCAT MSY for stocks of bigeye tuna, bluefin tuna, swordfish, and
yellowfin tuna and actual June 2012 average price in US Dollars per kilogram.
Species
MSY or Proxy of Stock in metric
Reported Market Value in
tonnes
US Dollars per kilogram
Bigeye
78,000 – 102,000
$8.46 – 9.36
Tuna
Bluefin
Western – 2,500
$11.82 – 16.58
Tuna
Eastern/Mediterranean – 13,500
Swordfish

Northern - 13,000 – 14,000
Southern – 15,000
Mediterranean – 14,600
115,000 – 145,000

Yellowfin
Tuna
Data from ICCAT 2012a, FIS 2012.

$14.42 - 18.92

$4.81 - 6.32

I then multiplied the total ICCAT-set MSY of each fishery by its respective
market price to compare the relative market value of each fishery. To ensure
consistency in this analysis, I applied the highest reported market price to the highest
MSY value or proxy for each stock. My calculations of the rough market value for the
fisheries for these four species follow in alphabetical order:
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1. Bigeye Tuna: 102,000 total mt x 1000kg = 102,000,000kg
$9.36/kg: 102,000,000 x $9.36 = $954,000,000
2. Bluefin Tuna: 16,000 total mt x 1000kg = 16,000,000kg
$16.58/kg: 16,000,000 x $16.58 = $265,280,000
3. Swordfish: 43,600 total mt x 1000kg = 43,600,000kg
$18.92/kg: 43,600,000 x $18.92 = $824,912,000
4. Yellowfin Tuna: 145,000 total mt x 1000kg = 145,000,000kg
$6.32/kg: 145,000,000 x $6.32 = $916,400,000
In summary, the value of the bluefin tuna fishery seems to be lowest of the
four fisheries compared across the Convention Area (See Table 13).

Table 14. Ranked summary of estimates of total market value of four ICCATmanaged fisheries.
ICCAT-Managed Fishery Estimated Total Market Value of Fishery Ranking
Bigeye Tuna

1. $954,000,000

Yellowfin Tuna
Swordfish
Bluefin Tuna

2. $916,400,000
3. $824,912,000
4. $265,280,000

These data contrast sharply with the common misperception that bluefin tuna
represent the most valuable fishery in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. This
MSY-based comparison is imperfect due to inflated catches of species that exceed
MSY, and has the potential to underestimate the total value of the fisheries by not
including multiplier effects and seasonality differences in prices paid for each fish.
However, this analysis is meant to be illustrative, and I have estimated the value of the
bluefin tuna fishery is many times lower than the others. My analysis is further
supported by an independent consulting firm’s estimate of the approximately US$300
million dollar value of the bluefin tuna fishery, which is reasonably close to my
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estimate (Bonini et al. 2011, pg. 16.). In addition, bluefin tuna catch constitutes less
than 5% of total tuna catch in the Convention Area. In light of its small contribution
to total tuna catch, it seems that bluefin tuna attract disproportionate magnitude of
ICCAT management and media attention. This analysis supports Hypothesis 2.

B. Hypotheses 3, 4: “Iconic” Status of Bluefin Tuna
I assert that bluefin tuna have been made popular in part through media
attention in the forms of television specials, movies, newspaper articles, and social
media campaigns. Popular television shows and documentaries such as “Fighting
Tuna,” “Wicked Tuna,” and “Tuna Wranglers” focus on catching and ranching bluefin
tuna. The British Broadcasting Corporation and National Geographic Society each
produced educational specials about bluefin, including “Blue Planet-Open Ocean” and
“Superfish: Bluefin Tuna” (National Geographic Society 2012). These media
productions focus on the over exploitation of many of the world’s fisheries, and
highlight the perceived “endangered” status of bluefin tuna, as in Charles Clover’s The
End of the Line (Clover 2008).
This “iconic” status makes bluefin tuna a powerful policy symbol that has the
effect helping to draw attention to an issue by groups of actors and advocacy
coalitions such as environmental and conservation NGOs (Harvey 1994). This
symbolism is powerful, as noted in the policy literature, because it helps to bring
issues such as the overfished state of both stocks of bluefin tuna, that are distant or
poorly-understood, into people’s homes (Appleyard 1979). When the plight of bluefin
tuna is brought into people’s homes through ads and conservation campaign media,

57	
  
	
  

	
  
social meanings about overfishing problems and the need to conserver ecosystems
tend to take the place of a focus on scientific information and meanings based on
research (Appleyard 1979, Harvey 1994). However, at the same time bluefin’s
symbolic power in the policy realm is on the rise, they have also captured the attention
of researchers more than other ICCAT species (See Tables 14 and 15).

Table 15. Results of peer-reviewed, published literature search queries for “Northern
Bluefin Tuna”.
Peer-Reviewed Journal
Years
Number of Articles with “Northern
Records Reviewed
Covered
Bluefin Tuna” in Title, Abstract
Nature
Science
Fisheries Research
Marine Policy

1973 - Present
1974 - Present
1986 - Present
1986 - Present

10
60
180
50

Ecology and Frontiers in
Ecology and the
Environment

1998 - Present

30

TOTAL

330

Table 16. Combined results of peer-reviewed, published literature database search
queries for “Bigeye Tuna” and “Yellowfin Tuna”.
Peer-Reviewed
Years Covered Number of Articles with “Yellowfin
Journal Records
Tuna” or “Bigeye Tuna” in Title,
Reviewed
Abstract
Nature
1964 - Present
3+3
Science
1968 - Present
2+1
Fisheries Research
1976 - Present
90 + 25
Marine Policy
1986 - Present
18 + 16
Ecology and Frontiers
1997 - Present
12 + 4
in Ecology and the
Environment
TOTAL
165
Articles about bluefin tuna are published 30% more frequently than works
about other ICCAT species. This provides support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
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Research popularity and powerful symbolism have helped bluefin tuna attain
and perpetuate an “iconic” and “charismatic” status (Doyle et al. 1995, Sissenwine et
al. 1998, Safina 1998, Worm and Duffy 2003, Mace 2004, Sergio et al. 2008, MartinLopez 2009, Collette 2011, Wolinsky 2012, See Table 16). ICCAT referenced this
special status of the species in their independent performance review, which was
driven by cries in the international community for a “hard look” at their effectiveness:
Civil society has taken stronger interest in management, especially for
iconic [bluefin] tuna species (ICCAT 2008 pg. 4).
Table 17. Characteristics of “charismatic,” “iconic” species and bluefin tuna compiled
from conservation biology and fisheries management literature (Doyle et al. 1995,
Sissenwine et al. 1998, Safina 1998, Worm and Duffy 2003, Mace 2004, Sergio et al.
2008, Martin-Lopez 2009, Collette 2011, Wolinsky 2012).
Attributes of
“Charismatic”
or “Iconic”
Corresponding Attributes of Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna
Species
Large Size
Largest bony fishes in the ocean.
More rare than any other tuna species, and perhaps more than any
Rare
other commercially harvested species
Found in every ocean in the world and migrate great distances;
interact with humans commonly. Fisheries for bluefin are the
Popular
oldest recorded in the world. Demand for their flesh largely drives
expansion of the world’s sushi industries. There are numerous
documentaries and popular television shows about bluefin tuna.
Ability to
Capture
Public
Imagination
High
Economic
Importance
“Threatened”
or
“Endangered”
Status

Bluefin tuna are highly regarded as game, sport, and table-fish
around the world, and are one of the fastest fishes in the sea. They
are utilized by environmental NGOs as “flagship” species to
attract public attention to conservation campaigns.
No fish sells for a higher price at market than bluefin tuna.
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
has listed all three bluefin tuna species around the world as
“Endangered” on their “Redlist”. Several attempts to list bluefin
under CITES have also been made. Both stocks of bluefin tuna in
the Convention Area are currently overfished.
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Based on these attributes, bluefin tuna meet and surpass the requirements of an
“iconic” species. They display all of the characteristics necessary to have attained this
status, and have the added benefit of a long, storied history of use as a powerful
symbol since at least 4,000 B.C., as evidenced by cave paintings with their image from
Sicily (Maggio 2000). This summary of literature supports Hypothesis 3.

C. Hypothesis 4: “Iconic” Status Contributes to ICCAT Management
A literature review provided little support for this hypothesis. The only
published evidence that supports this idea comes from the American Bluefin Tuna
Association and is anecdotal (Ruais 2011). I revisit this hypothesis in Chapter VI.

D. Hypothesis 5: Political Pressure Affects ICCAT Management
According to Hypothesis 5, non-scientific information and political pressure
from interest groups play a major role in influencing adoption of management tools at
ICCAT meetings, and a disproportionate amount of management attention and focus is
afforded to bluefin tuna. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) do put pressure
on ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna, as evidenced by various attempts to forbid trade of
the species internationally by many countries (ICCAT 2008, See Table 17). No such
attempts at legal protection have been made for other ICCAT species.
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Table 18. Summary table of attempts to secure legal protection for bluefin tuna.
Year
Type of Legal Protection Sought
Major Responsible Party
1974
1992

“Endangered” status under Sec. 4 of the
U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
Appendix 1 CITES listing

Sport Fishing Institute (SFI)

1994

Appendix 1 CITES listing

2010

Appendix CITES listing

Prince of Monaco

2010

“Threatened” or “Endangered” status
under Sec. 4 of the U.S. ESA

Center for Biological Diversity

2011

“Endangered” status under Canada’s
legal structure

Committee on the Status of
Endangered Wildlife in Canada
(COSEWIC)

National Audubon Society;
Government of Sweden
Greenpeace International;
Government of Kenya

E. Hypothesis 6: Status Affects ICCAT’s Management of Bluefin Tuna
According to Hypothesis 6, media scrutiny and heightened status of the bluefin
tuna affects the ability of ICCAT to effectively manage the species at MSY levels. The
efforts of conservation groups and environmental NGOs, coupled with intense media
attention on ICCAT in the mid-2000s, drove ICCAT to order an independent review
of the effectiveness of its organization (ICCAT 2008). The independent review
concluded that ICCAT’s handling of bluefin tuna management, on which the public
judges the effectiveness of the whole organization, amounted to an “international
disgrace” because they consistently set higher TACs than were recommended by their
own SCRS experts (ICCAT 2008, pg. 19). This disgrace impacted how ICCAT made
quota allocation decisions and set TAC levels, and provides some evidence to support
the idea that the strong policy symbol that the bluefin tuna has become impacts its own
management in complex ways.
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Specifically, there appears to be a link between attempts to list the bluefin tuna
under CITES and the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the setting of TACs in line
with scientific recommendations for the first time in decades. Some respondents and
the ICCAT Independent Performance Review in 2008 suggest that these two specific
efforts to secure legal protection for the fish were taken extremely seriously by ICCAT
for fear that they would lose their management mandate over the species forever
(ICCAT 2008). This symbolic power of the bluefin tuna helped create one of the small
successes in its management. As a result of the strong amount of scientific and nonscientific information fueled by environmental NGOs and other advocacy coalitions
pushing of the symbol of the overfished bluefin tuna, ICCAT began to lower TACs
substantially starting in the 2011-fishing year (ICCAT 2012c). This started a
decreasing trend in SCRS recommendations for TACs and the actual quotas set in a
given year (See Table 18). TACs and recovery plans based on them were identified in
Chapter I as the two bright spots in bluefin tuna management, and there is evidence
from the public policy literature that the use of the symbol of bluefin tuna and its
“iconic,” elevated status helped to create the momentum for this change. Importantly,
there is a lag time of a few years to ratchet TACs down in to scientifically based
levels, but this is due to the fact that TACs are set every other year for two years, so
are not adjusted at every annual meeting (ICCAT 2012a).
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Table 19. ICCAT SCRS TAC recommendation and TAC set for eastern
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea bluefin tuna by year.
Year
SCRS TAC Recommendation (mt) Quota Set by ICCAT (mt)
2003

15,000

32,000

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
15,000

32,000
32,000
32,000
29,500
28,500

2009
2010
2011
2012

8,500 - 15,000
8,000
8,000
8,000 - 15,000

22,000
19,950
13,500
12,900

2013
8,000 - 15,000
13,500
Modified and updated from Sumaila and Huang 2012. Table 5, pg. 507.
The second failed CITES listing attempt in 2010 led directly to
Recommendation 11-17 which emphasized ICCAT’s commitment to seeking out the
best available science on which to make its decisions, Recommendation 11-18 which
improves the use of trade sanctions and their effectiveness for flag states of vessels
involved in IUU fishing, and Recommendation 11-20 which strengthened the existing
bluefin catch documentation scheme to close catch reporting loopholes (ICCAT
2011c). Pressure from environmental groups also drove development of the eBCD
scheme (ICCAT 2011c). There is evidence that these measures were partially driven
by the special status of the species and public and NGO attention on bluefin tuna
management from the interviews, which will be discussed further in Chapter VI.
The special status of bluefin tuna influenced proposals to list Northern the
species under Section 4(a) 1 of the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973 and
Appendix 1 of CITES (Ruais 2011). These attempts failed to secure legal protection
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of bluefin tuna from directed fishing effort and international trade, but did succeed in
heightening public interest in the species. Interest group campaigns over the last four
decades have played a role in the politicization of the science presented at ICCAT
meetings that inform management decisions (Whynott 1995, Porch 2005, Ruais 2011).
For example, scientific advice was largely ignored in setting TACs in the Eastern
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea until several proposals for an Appendix 1 CITES listing
were made, partially due to the intense public attention on the subject (ICCAT 2008).
Finally, the poor state of the fisheries for bluefin tuna in the Western and
Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea had a lasting effect on the focus on management
of bluefin tuna that has not been consistent with the amount of attention paid to other
ICCAT-managed stocks (ICCAT 2008, Webster 2011). For decades, the main focus
of ICCAT has been on the bluefin tuna at the expense of yellowfin and bigeye
management, further research, and increasing compliance with mandatory ICCAT
Recommendations. Though bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna, and swordfish stocks are
much larger and more valuable than bluefin tuna stocks in the Convention Area,
proactive management of these species has taken a backseat to bluefin tuna priorities
(Webster 2011). These data provide evidence that supports Hypotheses 5 and 6.

2. Respondent Interview Results
A. The Respondents
Of the twelve interview respondents, five were female and seven were male.
The respondents had a minimum of two years and a maximum of twenty-two years of
experience in bluefin tuna management issues. The mean of the years of experience
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data per respondent was 14.25, and the mode of the data was fifteen years. Only three
of the twelve respondents had less than ten years of experience working on bluefin
tuna management issues, suggesting that the respondents had a sufficient amount of
expertise on the topic. One of the twelve key respondents had not personally taken
part in an ICCAT meeting, but had an in-depth knowledge of the tuna ranching
industry and management tools that made that respondent’s unique insight particularly
valuable. The respondents represent nine different interest groups from academia,
government agencies, fishing industry experts and bluefin tuna fishers and embody a
representative knowledge of bluefin tuna management from a U.S. perspective.

B. Fishery Management Tools Employed in Bluefin Tuna Fishery
First, respondents were asked to identify the current tools used by ICCAT to
manage the both stocks of bluefin tuna. Eleven respondents mentioned thirty-seven
tools, which were grouped into nine categories based on ICCAT lists (See Table 19).

Table 20. Summary of the management tool categories used by ICCAT to manage
stocks of bluefin tuna as identified by respondents in order of response frequency.

	
  

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

TACs (7)
Time/area closures (5)
East/west management boundary (5)
Minimum size limits (5)
Gear restrictions (4)
Catch documentation programs (4)
Limited effort programs (3)
Recovery plans (3)
MSY reference points (1)

Note: The number in parentheses in this chapter represents the number of respondents
who gave that specific response. Each participant provided more than one response.
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C. Factors Leading to Adoption of These Tools
Respondents were then asked to identify factors that led to adoption of the
specific tools. Forty-six factors were identified by eleven respondents, which were
grouped into sixteen categories. The mode of the data was four (See Table 20).
Table 21. Factors identified by respondents as important to ICCAT adoption of
management tools for the bluefin tuna fishery in order of response frequency.

	
  

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

East/west management boundary (6)
Complexity of fishery (5)
History of fishery (4)
Political pressure put on ICCAT (4)
Unique biology of the species (4)
CITES listing proposal threat (3)
Different management capacities of CPCs (3)
Insufficient catch reporting (3)
Bluefin tuna ranching and aquaculture (3)
Market value of species (2)
ICCAT independent performance review (2)
Organization of ICCAT (2)
Scientific uncertainty (2)
Threat of fishery closure (1)
TAC allocation change (1)
Broad media attention (1)

D. Management Tools Not Effectively Used in Bluefin Fishery
Third, respondents were asked what management tools have not yet been
effectively employed by ICCAT in the bluefin tuna fishery to identify possible
alternative management tools. Ten respondents identified twenty-two new potential
management tools. These tools were grouped into ten categories. The mode of the
number of tools noted by respondents was two (See Table 21).
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Table 22. Management tools not effectively used to manage bluefin tuna according to
respondents in order of response frequency.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

	
  

Time/area closures (4)
Protecting spawning aggregation hotspots (3)
Complete fishery closure (3)
Target and limit reference points for fishing mortality (2)
Dismiss CPCs from ICCAT for noncompliance (2)
Rescind bluefin quota from CPCs (2)
Fishery-wide limited access scenarios (2)
Improve catch reporting requirements (2)
Gear changes (1)
Increased peer review of scientific information (1)

E. Iconic Status of Bluefin and Implications for Management
Fourth, respondents were asked if bluefin tuna were an “iconic” or
“charismatic” species. One respondent thought that bluefin tuna should not be labeled
as an “iconic” species, but as “charismatic” instead. Respondents were also asked to
identify the impacts of this “iconic” or “charismatic” status on the management of
bluefin tuna. Twelve respondents identified forty-eight different impacts, which were
grouped into nine categories. The mode of the data was eight (See Table 22).
Table 23. Impacts and attributes of “iconic” or “charismatic” status of bluefin tuna on
their management as noted by respondents in order of response frequency.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Shaped public perception of bluefin tuna (9)
Increased media attention (8)
Became an important factor for bluefin tuna management (8)
Led to more effective management of bluefin tuna (6)
Increased focus on scientific information (5)
Complicates bluefin tuna management (4)
Helped grow conservation group membership (4)
Not as important as market value of scale of fishery (3)
Only important factor in developed countries (1)
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F. Impacts of Iconic Status of Bluefin on Resource, Industry
Respondents were asked about the impacts of the “iconic” or “charismatic”
status on both the bluefin resource and the fishing industry. Eleven respondents
suggested forty-six impacts that were grouped into ten impact themes. The mode of
the number of impacts mentioned was three (See Table 23).

Table 24. Impact themes of “iconic” or “charismatic” status of bluefin tuna on the
resource and fishing industry in order of response frequency.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ICCAT focuses on bluefin tuna at expense of other stocks (7)
Positive impact for the stock status of the species (7)
Created pressure for CITES listing proposal (7)
Affected prices/markets for bluefin tuna meat (6)
Created pressure to heed scientific advice of SCRS (5)
Introduced inter-country TAC allocation issues (3)
Led to catch documentation tool scheme changes (3)
Negatively impacted bluefin tuna fishing industry (3)
Introduced intra-country TAC allocation issues (2)

G. Future Priorities for ICCAT
Finally, experts were asked what ICCAT should prioritize in order to sustain
healthy populations of bluefin tuna in the short-term (less than five years). Eleven
respondents noted twenty-six priorities for ICCAT, which were grouped into seven
subject themes based on similarities. The mode of the number of priority themes
noted was three. Ten out of eleven respondents suggested that ICCAT prioritize
funding for scientific research programs such as tagging fish, researching bluefin tuna
life history such as mixing levels and data gathering projects (See Figure 12). The
results of all interviews are summarized in tabular form (See Table 24).
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Figure 12. Respondents’ opinions on what ICCAT should prioritize to maintain
healthy stocks of bluefin tuna over the next five years.
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Table 25. Quantitative summary table of respondents’ responses showing highest
levels of agreement on specific concepts.
Number of
Respondents
Concepts
Mentioning Concept /
Total Respondents
4 / 11

Time/Area closures have not yet been effectively utilized

6 / 12

High market value of species is an important factor
leading to the different management of bluefin tuna

7 / 11

“Iconic” status focused public attention for Appendix 1
CITES listings, had overall positive impact on the species
but at the expense of management of other ICCATspecies
National shares of TACs are an important bluefin tuna
management tool
“Iconic” status shaped public perception of the species
Scientific research should be an ICCAT priority to ensure
stocks of bluefin tuna remain healthy in the short-term

7 / 11
9 / 12
10 / 11
11 / 12

Bluefin tuna are an “iconic” species
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CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This discussion aims to dispel misconceptions about the nature of bluefin tuna
management in the ICCAT Convention Area by shedding light on common themes
from my literature review and key informant interview responses. I first examine the
contributing factors that led to the adoption of specific management tools in the
bluefin tuna fishery. Then, I summarize various levels of agreement of experts from
different interest groups to point to specific factors that drive bluefin’s unique
management, such as importance of the history of the fishery and the two-stock
hypothesis. Based on these findings, I provide management recommendations for
ICCAT to encourage effective management of bluefin tuna in the next five years.

1. Discussion of Literature Review Results
A. Bluefin Tuna Fishery is Not Most Valuable under ICCAT
I estimated that the bluefin tuna fishery was actually the lowest-value fishery
compared to the fisheries for bigeye tuna, swordfish, and yellowfin tuna. When media
outlets cite very high prices paid for a single bluefin tuna, they often erroneously or
carelessly assume that this is the market price for all bluefin tuna (Whynott 1995,
Mather et al. 1995, Ruais 2012). While the market value comparison presented in this
research does not attempt to provide an exact estimation of fishery value, it provides a
useful comparative tool that is reasonably close to a published economics firm
estimate (Bonini et al. 2011). Market factors such as seasonality of prices, changes in
prices of substitute and complimentary goods, and myriad multiplier effects such as
costs of highly-industrial longline and purse seine fleets could be taken into account in
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a more rigorous and complex market value analysis, but they are beyond the scope of
this project. Also, my analysis does not take IUU fishing into account, which would
likely skew the catch of all species far above MSY for each stock (ICCAT 2012c).
However, the illustrative nature of my analysis is enough to provide evidence
that bluefin’s market value does not vastly overshadow those of other fishes as is
commonly noted. My comparison is somewhat corroborated by the respondents.
Several respondents noted that the ICCAT-managed yellowfin tuna fishery is the most
valuable in the Atlantic Ocean; this assertion is plausible in light of my comparison.

B. Bluefin Tuna are a Popular, Special Status Species
As noted in Chapter V, a search engine query of “bluefin tuna” in five
influential, peer reviewed scientific journals in the fisheries management field reveal
that bluefin tuna are the most popular species for publication of all ICCAT-managed
stocks in terms of the frequency with which they are the topic of the research
publication in five influential journals. Whether or not this translates into the idea that
bluefin are the source of more research than both bigeye and yellowfin tuna combined
is a different issue. The point here is that for some reason, research with bluefin tuna
as its subject is undertaken and gets published more frequently than research with
other ICCAT-managed stocks (bigeye and yellowfin tuna) as its subject. Eleven of
twelve respondents agreed with the literature that state that bluefin tuna are in fact a
“charismatic,” “iconic” species that embody cultural or societal values, has physical
attributes such as large size, great speed, perceived intelligence, or exceeding rarity
that help humans identify with them.
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C. Special Status of Bluefin Tuna Affects its Management
Many NGO conservation groups with offices in the United States such as
Greenpeace International, Oceana, Pew Environment Group, World Wildlife Fund,
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the Center for Biological
Diversity, and the National Geographic Society all have specific bluefin tuna
conservation campaigns that solicit donations from members and non-members to
bolster Atlantic bluefin tuna populations through advocacy campaigns to reduce the
TACs for them (Oceana 2005, World Wildlife Fund 2012, Pew Environment Group
2009, National Geographic Society 2012, International Union for the Conservation of
Nature 2012). These groups were involved in both failed CITES listing proposals, as
well as numerous attempts to get Atlantic bluefin tuna protected domestically via the
Endangered Species Act (Whynott 1995, MacKenzie et al. 2008, Ruais 2011). These
campaigns have had an effect on bluefin tuna management over time (ICCAT 2008,
Ruais 2011). This added pressure from environmental groups put the management
focus of ICCAT squarely on bluefin tuna while increasing media attention and public
scrutiny (Weber 2002). It also fundamentally changed the public’s perception of a
fish that was once hardly considered cat food to the “iconic” and “charismatic” one it
is today. The ABTA sums up the effects of these conservation campaigns:
As a result of these relentless campaigns, the “magnificent” bluefin tuna
has evolved into the “charismatic” giant bluefin and now into the ‘iconic’
giant bluefin (Ruais 2011. pg. 2).
While there have been six attempts by many different countries worldwide
since 1975 to legally protect ICCAT-managed bluefin tuna with “threatened” or
“endangered” listings, there have been zero attempts made to legally protect other
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ICCAT-managed commercial species during the same amount of time. The architects
of these proposals were mostly coalitions of environmental non-profit groups and
some recreational fishing interests, which banded together to put political pressure on
ICCAT Commissioners and decision makers through media, advocacy campaigns,
fundraising, and direct lobbying (Whynott 1995, Porch 2005, Ruais 2011). The
“iconic” status of bluefin tuna helps drive its unique management by shaping public
perception, providing ammunition for interest groups to pressure ICCAT
Commissioners, and by affecting adoption of management recommendations.

D. Summary
All but Hypothesis 4 listed in Chapter I are supported to varying degrees by
literature review of peer-reviewed scientific literature, ICCAT official reports,
publications from environmental NGOs and conservation groups, real market prices,
industry group insights, and other documents. Actual market data, ICCAT official
reports, records of vessels, and literature from the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO) partially support Hypotheses 1 and 2 that the high market
value of bluefin tuna does not fully-account for the special attention and unique
management of the species. In addition, the relative value of the bluefin fishery itself
is not the greatest among ICCAT-managed stocks, nor is the value of the fishery
proportional to the special management attention it receives from ICCAT. Analyses of
these sources provide evidence to support Hypothesis 3 and partially support
Hypothesis 4. Bluefin have attained an “iconic” and “charismatic” status and that this
status contributes to ICCAT managing bluefin tuna differently than other species.
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Further, these sources suggest that non-scientific information and political pressure
play an important role in bluefin tuna management, and that this role is perhaps larger
for this species than for any other. In addition, ICCAT reports provide affirmative
support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, that suggest that non-scientific information and the
heightened status of the species affect ICCAT’s management of bluefin tuna.

2. Discussion of Key Informant Interview Results
A. Concordance of Literature Review and Respondent Insights
The point that bluefin tuna are the only “iconic” status species managed by
ICCAT is central to the argument made in this thesis: this special status directly and
indirectly influences the management of the species. All but one respondent noted
that the elevated status of the species is deserved, but that it pressures ICCAT to not
afford proportional management attention to other stocks based on scientific or
empirical information, such as relative market value, fleet size, or scale of fisheries. If
other species were to have an elevated status, perhaps they would be managed
differently or more intensely and with more creative management measures than other
more valuable or larger-scale ICCAT fisheries.
The weight of this “iconic” status seems to be quite large and has important
implications for bluefin tuna management. One respondent noted in their interview
that the iconic status of the species only matters to people in developed countries, and
that the status would probably matter less to people in developing countries.
However, in the case of bluefin tuna management, the most powerful and influential
ICCAT delegations that provide the science that supports management decisions and
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funding for research are all from developed countries, where this status has high
importance. ICCAT meetings, management focus, and research are all focused
squarely on bluefin tuna, at the expense of other species some respondents noted.
Three respondents mentioned an interesting anecdote on this topic. ICCAT
does not proportionally manage all stocks under its management. Silky sharks
(Carcharhinus falciformis) and porbeagle sharks (Lamna nasus), which each have
very poor stock statuses, do not have an “iconic” or “charismatic” status, and are much
worse off from a survival standpoint than bluefin tuna (Oceana 2012, ICCAT 2012c).
Yet these shark species are not a focus of ICCAT at management meetings because
they are caught as bycatch in non-targeted fisheries. Despite repeated attempts by
environmental NGOs and conservation groups, they have not been afforded the same
protections that bluefin tuna have (Oceana 2012). Respondents went further to note
that perhaps an “iconic” or “charismatic” status could help to contribute to better
management of these species by ICCAT, which raises important prioritization issues.
Interestingly, several respondents suggested that perhaps ICCAT’s
management focus should be on other non-bluefin tuna species, namely the Atlantic
swordfish or yellowfin tuna. While the “iconic” label of bluefin tuna seems to affect
its management, it remains a very complex and difficult question to gauge how not
having this label could impact other fisheries. For example, one informant noted that
ICCAT has shown an ability to effectively rebuild an overfished, valuable fishery that
they could use as a model for rebuilding bluefin tuna stocks. The swordfish fishery
was overfished with overfishing occurring for all three management stocks back in the
1990s (ICCAT 1994). Despite lack of an “iconic” or “charismatic” label or pressure
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for legal protection for swordfish, ICCAT imposed strict catch limits, adopted
measures to reduce capacity in the fleet, and established an aggressive rebuilding goal
for these stocks. All three swordfish stocks were successfully rebuilt by the mid
2000’s ahead of the rebuilding timeline (ICCAT 2008). This success story raises the
question of what impact an “iconic” status would have had on swordfish.
A few respondents expressed concern and confusion that yellowfin tuna, with a
significantly higher biomass and a much lower susceptibility to overfishing than
bluefin tuna in the Convention Area, are not prioritized by ICCAT for rigorous
scientifically based management. These stocks should not be ignored, however, in
light of the large scale, fleet, and high value of the fisheries for them. Several
respondents also noted that the so-called “tropical tunas” are not prioritized for
research by the United States, or any other CPC for that matter. “Grande” and other
scientific research programs are largely driven by contributions from developed,
wealthy CPCs that put value on the iconic status of the bluefin tuna. This species is
the focus of scientific research while other stocks still may not even have MSY
estimates or proxies, which are basic parameters necessary to effectively manage their
stocks based on ICCAT’s stated management goals.
It is necessary to continue to study levels of mixing in bluefin tuna stocks, and
the Grande program should be continued. However, it seems as though the “iconic”
status of bluefin tuna may actually have an overall negative impact on management of
ICCAT’s stocks on the whole, because the bluefin tuna takes up most of the limited
management capacity, attention, and research and enforcement funding even though
other stocks have equally poor stock status. While eleven respondents called for more
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funding to research bluefin tuna to help sustain healthy stocks in the near future,
perhaps more research on non-bluefin species would spur more equitable allocation of
management resources and lead to more effective management of ICCAT stocks.

B. Outlook for ICCAT-Managed Bluefin Tuna
ICCAT continued the recent trend of adopting TACs that are within the
scientific recommendations of the SCRS to help rebuild the western Atlantic and the
eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stocks at the November 2012 ICCAT General
Meeting in Agadir, Morocco:
The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) [has] adopted positive measures that will help conserve the
iconic Atlantic bluefin tuna, and advance shark protection in the future
(World Fishing and Aquaculture 2012, pg. 1).
Based on the 2012 updated stock assessments for bluefin tuna, both the
western Atlantic and eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea stocks are showing signs of
increasing abundance and recovery, which is good news for the species and managers
alike. As six respondents noted, this trend can be extended to the benefit of the
species and the fishery with a dedicated effort by ICCAT and its CPCs to implement
and enforce scientifically based TACs. However, the pressures that contributed to the
decline of bluefin tuna stocks, namely overfishing, IUU fishing, under-reporting of
catch, high market value of individual bluefin tuna, and others, remain. ICCAT still
has the difficult, but not impossible, task of transparently managing its bluefin fishery.

3. Recommendations and Future Research
A. Specific Recommendations for ICCAT Management of Bluefin Tuna
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Despite recent signs of increasing abundance of bluefin tuna stocks, recovery
of the species remains uncertain. Recovery would be very important to the field of
fisheries management since ICCAT is perhaps the most closely monitored fishery
management organization in the world, and successful bluefin tuna management could
restore some faith in international fisheries management. Toward these ends, I provide
practical recommendations for ICCAT based on this thesis. ICCAT must:
1. Retain much of their present management scheme for bluefin tuna for the
foreseeable future.
2. Continue funding the Atlantic-wide bluefin “Grande” research program to
obtain important life history information to better-manage stocks.
3. Work with, and not against, environmental NGOs and conservation groups
to draw attention to other managed stocks in need of conservation, such as
silky sharks and porbeagle sharks, and focus management attention more
equitably across all stocks.
4. Work with, and not against, environmental NGOs and conservation groups
to shift media spotlight away from bluefin tuna and toward other stocks, so that
they may be managed based on scientific evidence for the benefit of the fishing
industry and CPCs.
ICCAT manages bluefin tuna differently than other stocks for a variety of
reasons including the peculiar biology, life history, and characteristics of the fishery.
It should continue to utilize regulations that govern ranching and farming operations,
reduce and eliminate IUU fishing, and divide up national shares of the TAC based on
the best available science. The current provisions for multilateral trade sanctions
against non-compliant fishing entities, mandatory observer coverage, IUU vessel
blacklist, record of ranching operations, documentation schemes, and research quota
set-asides currently in place should be retained to allow for effective management of
the fishery. It is critical that ICCAT continue to set scientifically based TACs and
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prove to the world that they can rebuild bluefin tuna stocks to restore confidence in
RFMO management of shared resources. However, efforts to reduce IUU fishing and
to increase understanding of the science undermining the current two-stock
management framework should be undertaken with more vigor.
In this light, it is imperative that ICCAT CPCs continue to fund the “Grande”
bluefin research program around the Convention Area in order to decipher complex
life history attributes of bluefin tuna. The appropriateness of both the two-stock
management framework currently employed by ICCAT to manage bluefin tuna and
the low- and high-recruitment stock status scenarios presented by the SCRS remain
hotly debated topics in scientific and ICCAT literature, and must continue to be fueled
by the best scientific advice possible. Increased bluefin tuna life history information
should inform new management frameworks to replace ICCAT’s current 2-stock
management based on landings data and further information on rates of mixing.
Scientific evidence seems to suggest that managing bluefin tuna as a single stock is
more appropriate from a biological perspective, and could allow for easier
implementation of uniform Recommendations and Resolutions throughout the
Convention Area. Alternatives to the two-stock management should be explored.
Next, while bluefin tuna get most of the media and management attention over
other ICCAT stocks, they are not most susceptible to becoming collapsed. Instead,
stocks of sharks, billfishes, and other species caught as bycatch in other non-target
fisheries are much worse off than bluefin, especially silky and porbeagle sharks.
These are the species that should have the attention of conservation and environmental
NGOs, both because of their poor stock status and because they are not harvested
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commercially. ICCAT can work together with environmental NGOs and conservation
organizations to draw attention to these species through education campaigns.
I do not recommend that ICCAT, scientists, the media, or conservation groups
ignore bluefin tuna just because their stocks seem to rebounding according to aerial
and tagging surveys, but rather that these groups should strive to work together to
prioritize management focus on other stocks in a triage-like fashion in the next five
years. ICCAT could cooperate with NGOs, academics, and others to learn from the
rise of bluefin to an “iconic” species, and utilize these lessons learned, momentum and
techniques to build up public interest and standing of other species with poor stock
statuses. This could also help build political will and momentum to more effectively
manage such stocks. Then, ICCAT should strive to provide proportional management
focus and effort to other managed stocks based on three utilitarian criteria: CPC
involvement, rough employment, fleet size, and scale of the fishery. Perhaps this
approach can allow for more balance of management effort. Nor do I recommend
striving to elevate all species’ statuses to the “iconic” level that bluefin tuna have
attained. In fact, a species cannot be considered “iconic” or “charismatic” unless they
share some specific attributes such as large size, rarity in nature, ability to capture
public imagination, or other characteristics. Instead, I suggest that ICCAT and NGOs
be mindful of the rise of the status of bluefin tuna, and be congnizant of the fact that
this elevated status does not necessarily help in allowing the species to be managed
based on the best scientific advice of the SCRS. This research suggests that there is
potential of a species’ elevated status to positively affect its management, but at a
potential cost. Therefore, ICCAT and other partners should strive to call attention to
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species in need of conservation but keep their mandate of managing based on the best
available science in mind as well.
Finally, the added media scrutiny, non-scientific information, and political
jockeying that accompany bluefin tuna discussions at ICCAT meetings do not seem to
help Commissioners set scientifically-based Recommendations to manage stocks.
These efforts instead seem to hurt specific sectors of the fishing industry for bluefin
tuna that are well managed, such as the highly selective artisanal hook-and-line,
harpoon, or trap fishers. The groups responsible for these sources of information
should instead focus on truly detrimental fishing practices, such as IUU fishing, that
have undermined ICCAT’s management for decades (Pew 2010, ICCAT 2012c).

B. Future Research
With additional time and funding for travel, I would present a synopsis of my
research to a major peer-reviewed scientific journal for publication and to the ICCAT
SCRS for consideration and review at one of their semi-annual meetings. In addition,
I would conduct research on the specific impacts that the “iconic” status of bluefin has
on its management compared to other ICCAT stocks that do not share that status, such
as silky sharks. A comparison of ICCAT’s management of Northern bluefin tuna to
the management of the Pacific bluefin and the Southern bluefin tuna by other RFMOs
around the world would hold valuable lessons for fisheries management as well.
Specifically, I propose a study to explore whether or not all three bluefin species share
an “iconic” status and the implications of this status on their management.
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4. Conclusion
Bluefin tuna are different than other ICCAT managed stocks in many ways as
a result of a complex interaction of biological, social, political, and economic factors
that continue to evolve over time. These factors include, but are not limited to,
development of increasingly capital and technology-intensive fisheries for bluefin
tuna, commercialization and industrialization of the fishery, the unique life history of
the species, and the increasing value of meat for the sushi market. Not all factors have
equal bearing or weight on management outcomes, and no one factor fully accounts
for the management framework in place to manage bluefin tuna fisheries. This thesis
research dispels common misconceptions that bluefin stocks are overfished and
overfishing is occurring for them solely due to Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons,”
or because of the high prices paid for bluefin meat alone. It is important that the
common perceptions in the fisheries management, political science, and legal
literature are accurate and based on factual information. The literature should be more
clearly informed on the role of these relevant factors that contribute to management in
order to inform more logical thinking, decision-making and management of fisheries.
The fact that bluefin tuna are the only “iconic” status species managed by
ICCAT is central to the argument made in this thesis. This status influences the
management of the species in tangible ways, namely through its role in creation of an
important policy symbol that can be seen in greater numbers of Recommendations and
Resolutions, management and media attention, and greater non-scientific inputs to the
decision-making process of bluefin tuna management. This research suggests that the
special status has been beneficial to the stock status of the bluefin tuna in the
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Convention Area, but not necessarily for other ICCAT stocks or ICCAT management
on the whole. ICCAT tends to focus management attention, intensity, and limited
resources on bluefin tuna while not prioritizing management of other stocks. This
understanding is critical in finding solutions to perhaps the most complex fisheries
management saga of our time: rebuilding stocks of this important and unique species,
and restoring the management effectiveness of ICCAT as a whole (Magnuson 2001).
Through broader understanding of the context of the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna
fishery of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, opportunities exist for more
effective management of this and other ICCAT-managed fisheries in the future.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I. Copy of Email to Potential Key Informants for Interview Request

Mr./Mrs. ___________,

I am currently a Master's student at the University of Rhode Island working on a thesis
on the management of Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna.

Would you be willing to share some of your insights with me in a short, confidential
interview to support my thesis research? I am especially interested in hearing some of
the politics involved in the unique management of bluefin tuna.

Thank you very much in advance. I look forward to speaking with you soon.

Sincerely,
Patrick Samuel
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Appendix II. Copy of Consent to Participate Form
“The Management Regime of the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT): What Makes Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus)
Different?”
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH
You have been invited to take part in a research project described below. The
researcher will explain the project to you in detail. Feel free to ask questions. If you
have more questions later, I, Patrick Samuel, may be reached at (916) 502-6874 or my
advisor, Professor Seth Macinko, may be reached at (401) 874-2471 to discuss them
with you.
Description of the project:
This research will use data from interviews to allow the researcher to gain a better
understanding of factors that contribute to ICCAT’s unique management of bluefin
tuna among other managed species in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.
What will be done:
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be interviewed regarding your
thoughts as they pertain to ICCAT’s management approaches used for bluefin tuna.
The interview will last roughly an hour and I will take notes with your permission.
The only additional involvement that may be asked of you would be a brief follow-up
at some point after the initial interview for clarification of any information originally
shared.
Risks or discomfort:
There is minimal risk in participating in this interview.
Benefits of this study:
This study can benefit the management of bluefin tuna in the Atlantic Ocean in
enhancing understanding of the factors that contribute to unique management for one
species (bluefin tuna) among others. This study may benefit you as a stakeholder in
bluefin tuna management by allowing you to talk through some of these factors and
potential implications of these for the resource and the fishing industry.
Confidentiality:
Your participation and information shared in this study is confidential. None of the
information will identify you by name. No one else will know if you participated in
this study and no one else can find out what your answers were. All written records
will be stored in a locked file cabinet in Patrick Samuel’s office at the Coastal Institute
Kingston at the University of Rhode Island. Transcripts from interviews will be
encrypted and stored on the student investigator’s password protected computer.
Scientific reports and academic presentations of this study will be based on group data
and will not identify you or any individual as taking part in this project. Data will be
destroyed three years after the completion of the study.
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In case there is any injury to the subject:
This study is not expected to cause any injury. If this study causes you any injury, you
should write or call the office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College
Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 8744328.
Decision to quit at any time:
The decision to take part in this study is voluntary. If you decide to take part in the
study, you may decline to answer any question. You may also quit at any time. If you
wish to quit during the interview, please inform the interviewer immediately. If you
wish to quit at a later time, please inform Professor Seth Macinko at (401) 874-2471
or Patrick Samuel at (916) 502-6874 of your decision.
Rights and Complaints:
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your
complaints with Seth Macinko, Associate Professor of Marine Affairs, at (401) 8742471 or macinko@uri.edu, or Patrick Samuel, Master of Marine Affairs student, at
(916) 502-6874 or pjsamuel@my.uri.edu, anonymously, if you choose. In addition, if
you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College Road, Suite 2, University
of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, or by telephoning (401) 874-4328.
Important:
Although this research is studying the factors that contribute to the unique
management of Atlantic bluefin tuna, this research is neither for nor against any
management regime. My research is about the factors that contribute to this unique
management and the implications it has for the resource and the fishing industry.
Answer questions based simply on what you know; do not worry about not knowing
some answers.
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature
on this form means that you are at least 18 years old, you understand the information,
and you agree to participate in this study.
Thank you for your voluntary participation.
________________________
Signature of Participant

________________________
Signature of Researcher

_________________________
Typed/printed Name

________________________
Typed/printed name

__________________________
Date

_______________________
Date
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Appendix III. List of Questions Posed to Interview Respondents

1. How long have you been involved in bluefin tuna research or management issues?
2. What approaches does ICCAT currently use to manage bluefin tuna?
3. What factors contributed to adoption of these specific management tools?
4. What management tools has ICCAT not tried to use to manage bluefin tuna?
5. What are the impacts, if any, of broad media attention and the “iconic” or
“charismatic” status that bluefin tuna have attained on their management?
6. What are the consequences, if any, of this status on the bluefin tuna resource and
the fishing industry?
7. What should ICCAT prioritize in the short-term to ensure stocks of bluefin tuna
remain healthy?
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